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**THE KOREAN CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN THE UNITED STATES**

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

PART II


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CONTENTS

WITNESSES

Tuesday, June 22, 1976:	
Lee Jai Hyon, Ph. D., associate professor of journalism, Western Illinois University-----	Page 2
Roland, Robert W., private citizen, of Las Vegas, Nev-----	14
Wood, Allen Tate, former president, Freedom Leadership Foundation_	20
Monday, September 27, 1976:	
Elkins, Chris, former member, Freedom Leadership Foundation----	44
Thursday, September 30, 1976-----	59
(Executive session at which unprinted testimony of Neil Albert Salonen, president, Freedom Leadership Foundation, was heard.)	

APPENDIX

1. Letter from Pak Bo Hi, president, Korean Cultural and Freedom Foundation, to Hon. Donald M. Fraser, dated June 15, 1976-----	61
2. Letter from Neil Albert Salonen, president, Freedom Leadership Foundation, to Robert B. Boettcher (staff consultant, Subcommittee on International Organizations), dated June 17, 1976-----	62
3. "President Park and His Learned Friends: Some Observations on Contemporary Korean Statecraft," article from the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, October-December 1975, by Sugwon Kang----	63
4. Transcript of the NBC-TV program, "Weekend," Saturday, May 1, 1976-----	70
5. "Seoul Officials Deny Links to Moon Sect," article from the New York Times, May 27, 1976-----	76
6. "Korean's Gift to Representative Bonker of Washington Raises Propriety Questions," article from the (Portland) Oregonian, by Bill Keller, June 10, 1976-----	78
7. "Japanese-Korean Relations, August-September 1974: A Chronology of Events," prepared by Bill Garvelink-----	80
8. Text of resolution adopted by the Committee on International Relations on September 1, 1976, authorizing the issuance of subpoenas-----	84
9. Bibliography of articles concerning KCIA activities in the United States_	85

ACTIVITIES OF THE KOREAN CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN THE UNITED STATES

TUESDAY, JUNE 22, 1976

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2:45 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald M. Fraser (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. FRASER. The subcommittee will come to order.

I apologize for the delay in beginning the hearing. The House has been engaged in a series of votes, which have just now been completed.

The subcommittee meets today to continue its inquiry into allegations of illegal or improper activities by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in the United States. This hearing is the third in a series. The subcommittee has received sworn testimony in public session on March 17 and in executive session on March 25.¹

From this testimony and the findings of the subcommittee staff, it appears that the KCIA is engaged in a large-scale effort to silence critics of President Park Chung Hee and to manipulate public and congressional attitudes to maintain and increase U.S. military and economic aid to South Korea.

These activities have included: Harassment and intimidation of Koreans and American citizens who are critical of the Park regime; covert financing of pro-Park communications media; manipulation of Korean residents' association elections; and attempts to influence elections for public office in this country.

The purpose of this hearing is to further examine information regarding alleged ties between the South Korean Government or the Korean CIA and certain persons and organizations associated with Sun Myung Moon. These relationships and activities may be in violation of one or more statutes regulating the activities of foreign agents.

Many people have contacted my office regarding this hearing and seem to have the impression that the subcommittee is investigating the Unification Church, which Sun Myung Moon heads. Let me say at the outset that this is not the case. This hearing is not concerned with the religious philosophy or practices of the Unification Church. Those are protected by the first amendment and those rights are inviolable.

The point must be made, however, that Moon is at the hub of a vast network of organizations including not only his church but

¹ See hearings held by the Subcommittee on International Organizations, entitled "Activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in the United States—Part I."

also political, cultural, academic, and commercial enterprises. On the basis of testimony received in executive session and information developed by the subcommittee staff, some of the activities which occur within this organizational framework can be called into question.

In preparing for this hearing, deliberate efforts were made to present a balanced panel of witnesses. Pak Bo Hi, special assistant and interpreter to Sun Myung Moon and president of the Korean Cultural and Freedom Foundation, has been invited three times to appear before the subcommittee. Three times he has refused.

Also, Neil A. Salonen, president of the Freedom Leadership Foundation and several other Moon organizations, met with me on May 27, and at that time accepted an invitation to testify before this subcommittee. However, by letter, dated June 17, 1976, Mr. Salonen withdrew his acceptance.

Without objection, the letters of Pak Bo Hi and Neil A. Salonen will be accepted into the record.¹

I note these refusals not to impugn the motives of either party, but rather to demonstrate efforts made to hear both sides of this controversy. These refusals are very unfortunate since the subcommittee will not have the opportunity to hear testimony from those most directly involved.

The subcommittee will hear today from Prof. Lee Pai Hyon, associate professor of journalism at Western Illinois University and a former Korean Embassy official; Robert W. Roland, a United Air Lines pilot appearing in a private capacity; and Allen Tate Wood, former president of the Freedom Leadership Foundation.

According to customary procedures in this subcommittee, questions will be addressed to the witnesses as a panel, after all three have completed their opening statements. In connection with the administration of the oath, witnesses may decline to answer questions if they believe the questions might tend to incriminate them. Also, if a statement might tend to defame or incriminate other persons, provision is made for the taking of such testimony in executive session.

We will ask each witness to be sworn in the order of their appearance. The first witness this afternoon is Prof. Lee Jai Hyon. Professor Lee, if you will stand and raise your right hand.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give the subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. LEE. Yes, I do.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Professor Lee, and will you proceed, sir.

**STATEMENT OF DR. LEE JAI HYON, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF
JOURNALISM, WESTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY**

Mr. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the committee to testify on activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, the KCIA, in the United States in the context of U.S. policy toward Korea and developments affecting the human rights in that country.

¹ See appendixes 1 and 2, pp. 61 and 62.

Last summer when I testified before this committee with regard to the repression of human rights in South Korea and its implications for U.S. policy,¹ I pointed out the existence at the Korean Embassy in Washington, D.C., of KCIA plans for clandestine operations in the United States.

Mr. FRASER. Perhaps it would be helpful if you would indicate how long you worked for the Government of South Korea, and what was your last position. What was it when you left. Just by way of introduction.

Mr. LEE. I was with the South Korean Government for almost 20 years. The last date of my service with the Korean Government was June 5, 1973, on which date I resigned in protest of the Park regime's dictatorial measures, and sought political asylum in the United States.

Mr. FRASER. Where were you serving at that time?

Mr. LEE. I was serving with the Korean Embassy here in Washington. I had been here since January 1970.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you.

Mr. LEE. I testified that in the spring of 1973, the Ambassador called frequent meetings at which I had been also present as Chief Cultural and Information Attaché and concurrently Director of the Korean Information Office in the United States.

In these meetings, the KCIA station chief and his senior aides oriented the key embassy staff to the clandestine operational schemes. After a few sessions, I realized that the meetings were in fact an initiation of converting all the diplomatic and consular officers into KCIA auxiliaries.

From my own personal knowledge, I testified to you last June that Park's plans for clandestine operations in this country included:

First, to seduce and, if possible, buy off American leaders, particularly in Congress.

Second, to apply covert pressure on the important American businessmen who have vested interest in Korea to exercise their influence in the Congress and the administration to support Park's repressive policies.

Third, to organize American and Korean business groups that would voice support for Park.

Fourth, to organize professional associations and societies of Korean scholars and scientists in the United States with reward of embassy entertainment and possibly all expense-free VIP trips to Korea.

Fifth, to organize indirectly, or to finance covertly scholastic meetings, seminars, and symposia of Korean and American professors to rationalize Park's dictatorship, or at least, to curb their criticism.

Sixth, to publish through its collaborators and frontmen pro-Park Korean community newspapers in the United States.

Seventh, to operate and finance Park's propaganda broadcasting.

Eighth, to regiment Korean communities in the United States by infiltrating Korean resident associations.

¹ See statement by Professor Lee in hearings held by the Subcommittee on International Organizations on June 10, 1975, entitled "Human Rights in South Korea and the Philippines: Implications for U.S. Policy" (p. 177).

Ninth, to intimidate “uncooperative” Koreans and Korean Americans through their families, relatives, and close friends in Korea to silence their criticism, and to make already silent ones more “cooperative.”

In that testimony, I made a number of serious charges regarding the KCIA’s illicit activities within the United States, citing specific incidents which fell in with the pattern of that master plan.

Since then, those charges have been further reinforced by new facts and more evidences provided in the March 17, 1976, testimonies before this committee by Mr. Donald L. Ranard, former Director of Korean Affairs Office at the Department of State from early 1970 to the end of 1974, I believe; Prof. Gregory Henderson, an expert of Korean affairs who had twice served in Korea as a diplomat with the American Embassy; and Mr. Kim Woon Ha, publisher of Los Angeles Korean community weekly who is one of the victims of such KCIA operations.

Therefore, I need not take up the time of this committee by restating what is already on the record. In my testimony today, I will simply elaborate some of those evidences where I deem it necessary and add my new observations.

Now that the KCIA became the complete control mechanism of Park’s dictatorship which monitors, controls and manipulates virtually all aspects of Korean life—political, economic, cultural and academic—and which attempts to do the same in the United States, ambassadors, diplomatic and consular offices are in actuality nothing other than a slightly more respectable facade of the KCIA. Some are willing collaborators and others are marionettes of dictator Park’s control apparatus at best.

For example, not only KCIA but also Korean consulate staff have unlawfully interfered with the U.S. Constitution-guaranteed rights of Korean Americans and Korean residents during the recent elections for president and vice president of the Korean Resident Association of San Francisco.

It is alleged that the KCIA and Korean consulate at San Francisco were bitterly opposed to one slate which ran against the KCIA- and Korean consulate-supported candidates. Many evidences indicate that the KCIA and Korean consulate were engaged in questionable practices to defeat Presidential candidate Kim Young Baik.

Several of Kim Young Baik campaign workers were allegedly warned by KCIA agent Limb Man Sung not to support Kim Young Baik. At least one businessman was also told likewise.

Another supporter of Kim Young Baik was reported to have received a telephone call from his family in Korea urging him not to work for Kim Young Baik.

The running mate of Kim Young Baik was also called by his family in Korea and was told that “the other side is supported by the—South Korean—Government, so it is best not to run.”

It is important to note in the above two cases that neither of them had previously let their families in Korea know anything about their activities on behalf of Kim Young Baik.

Buddhist priest Lee Han Sang, who presides over the Monterey Korean community’s Sambo-sa temple, was reported to be pressured by the KCIA and Korean consulate to bring his congregation up to San Francisco to vote.

When such illegal activities were exposed in the Korea Journal, a Korean community fortnightly in the bay area, Korean Consul-General Shin Dong Won issued an arrogant and threatening public statement against this paper. That official statement was quoted in the Dong-A Ilbo's Los Angeles edition, known as Mijoo Dong-A, of March 11, 1976.

As I translate the direct quote from the Consul-General's statement in Korean, it reads:

Hoping that the Korea Journal will repent of its conduct and will place itself on the right track of journalism, I issue a stern warning to this newspaper.

This is an open intimidation and improper challenge by an accredited foreign government representative to the American constitutional guarantee of free press.

Apparently misusing the privileges of diplomatic and consular immunities, Park's Consul-General Shin is openly and unlawfully meddling in the internal affairs of the lawful residents and citizens of the United States.

Since I testified last year there have been other cases in Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York where the KCIA and Korean consulates have attempted to influence the selection of officers for the various Korean resident associations, and have tried to influence their policies, particularly with respect to support of the Park regime.

Threats and intimidations are common practices of Dictator Park Chung Hee's representatives even within the United States. Another instance is the implied threat made against Elizabeth Pond, a Christian Science Monitor correspondent, by Park's ambassador to this country, Hahm Pyong Choon.

According to the Christian Science Monitor article, Hahm told the Monitor's editor John Hughes in early June 1974, that she might be "received discourteously" if she visited South Korea again.

Asked whether the statement implied physical violence, Hahm suggested that his government might not be able to control an "incident manufactured by North Korean subversives posing as South Korean thugs."

Last year, I enumerated such examples as the disruption by KCIA agent and karate strongmen of a meeting of Korean-Americans and residents which Kim Dae Jung was to address in San Francisco before he was kidnaped by the KCIA from a Tokyo hotel; a telephone call from the KCIA headquarters in Seoul—obviously coordinated by its agents in this country, to the master of ceremonies at an assembly of Korean Christian scholars in St. Louis warning him against an anti-Park statement; taking pictures of demonstrators protesting against Park's dictatorship to identify them, to create fears among them, and to intimidate them through their families or relatives in Korea.

By the way, such a photographer in action was recently filmed by the NBC and aired in its "Weekend" report of May 1.¹

Death threats by telephone calls, threat of violence by kicking the door well after midnight and then running away, attempts to break up meetings against Park's repression, organizing deceitful rallies in support of the Park regime, extorting money from Korean business-

¹ See appendix 4, p. 70.

men. The NBC also interviewed a victim recently and filmed him in shadow.

South Korean diplomatic and consular missions in this country still continue to carry out these tactics to harass and intimidate people within the United States.

Although less visible, the KCIA also has been active among the academics. Prof. Kang Sugwon of Hartwick College at Oneonta, N. Y., did a research and wrote a scholastic paper on this subject, which was published in the October-December 1975, edition of the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, and in the January-February 1976, issue of Worldview.

This paper contains an extensive collection of facts to which any attempt of summary would do only injustice. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit for inclusion in the record a copy of Professor Kang's paper: "President Park and His Learned Friends: Some Observations on Contemporary Korean Statecraft."

Mr. FRASER. Without objection, it will be included at an appropriate point in the record.¹

Mr. LEE. Last March there was a conference on Asian studies in Toronto, Canada, which was attended by many American and Korean scholars from the United States. Attendants later reported that a KCIA front offered the conference \$3,000 to pay the expenses of pro-Park scholars coming from the United States. The conference refused the offer, and the refusal became a point of heated debate between some of the participating members.

With regard to this conference, the aforementioned NBC television program reported that:

Two months earlier, Professor T. C. Rhee was advised by the (Korean) Embassy to either dilute his paper or not present it. The paper was anti-Park. Rhee, who is an American citizen, tells how part of the telephone conversation went.

Then the report was followed by a filmed interview of Professor Rhee. I will not restate it here.

At this point, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit for inclusion in the record this transcript which I made from the actual broadcast of the NBC television's "Weekend" report of May 1, 1976; "KCIA in the United States," by James Gannon.

Mr. FRASER. Without objection, we will include the transcript in the record, subject to verification.²

Mr. LEE. Considering the difficulty of televising such a subject matter, it was an excellent indepth reporting on the KCIA's activities in the United States. The substance was thoroughly comprehensive and accurate in every aspect, and the presentation was factual, fair, and well-balanced.

But a month later, on June 5, 1976, during the "Weekend" report, the NBC made some strange corrections. It said:

In the last month's report on the Korean CIA, we made two errors.

We said KCIA censors are in Korean newspaper offices. We should have said they used to be. They were withdrawn about a year ago following a protest strike.

¹ See appendix 3, p. 63.

² See appendix 4, p. 70.

We also said these eight men were hanged before they could appeal their death sentences. They did appeal to the Korean Supreme Court but still had two other appeals open when they were executed, despite a Korean Government prosecutor's assurance that they would not be.

Neither error alters the report's basic point; the Korean CIA operates illegally in this country; and our government appears to be doing nothing to stop it.

The second point is only a further elaboration of the fact originally stated, so there is no problem. But the first one is different. Because the original report of May 1 was entirely correct, and the NBC nevertheless took the pain of correcting it to become wrong. This is extraordinary.

There have been reports from Seoul by American correspondents that indicate otherwise. Dateline Seoul, May 19, 1975, Don Oberdorfer of the Washington Post reported:

Within hours of Park's new decree last Tuesday (which means the Presidential Emergency Measure No. 9 of May 13, 1975, by the way), agents of the Korean CIA moved back into newspaper offices on a full-time basis to monitor and virtually edit the news.

On September 19, 1975, Richard Halloran of the New York Times reported from Seoul that: "The press, according to all sources here, is under complete censorship." I have other impeccable sources who confirm to this effect.

Professionally speaking, I am very curious about this most unusual practice of the NBC. Knowing the KCIA as I do, knowing the KCIA's master plan which includes among other things the use of influential American businessmen; knowing the pressure the Park regime brought to bear upon the Christian Science Monitor, and knowing the vested interest in South Korea of the NBC's sister company, RCA, I would like to find out if there was an invisible hand of the Park regime behind the NBC's making of this reverse correction.

As a professor of journalism, I have an academic interest in such problems of the press. So the next day, I sent a mailgram to the president of NBC requesting equal time for rebuttal and answers to my questions. Therefore, I expect to hear from the NBC.

Such seemingly improbable things are highly probable, with the KCIA as I have known it. In this regard, there is another case which may seem hardly probable to most people. That is, the ambiguous circumstance in which U.S. Army Spec. Michael E. Kerr was ejected from Korea by the U.S. Army unit while he was serving in Korea.

Since Professor Henderson has already taken up this incident in his testimony before this committee, I will only add that I am of the same conclusion after my own independent assessment of Michael Kerr's documentation of the case, which warrants a thorough investigation for possible KCIA influence on the U.S. Army field commanders in Korea and their superiors in Washington.

With regard to the broadcast media, I pointed out before this committee last year the KCIA's plan to operate, finance, and subsidize pro-Park propaganda Korean language broadcasting in the United States. After my testimony, I received an interesting telephone call followed by a letter signed by a high ranking official of a South Korean Government mission in the United States.

His letter tells me how it is done—at least in this particular case of which he has personal knowledge. Other than the brief community news which the broadcasting organization produces only in voice, all other programs are produced in film or tape by the Government-owned and Government-operated Korean Broadcasting System, which has a correspondent here in Washington, by the way, in Seoul specifically for such overseas use, and sent over here by diplomatic pouch.

With this subsidy in mind, his production cost is almost nil, and the advertising revenue is all his. Other inside sources tell me that at least some of them also receive money from the Korean Government sources.

Nowadays, virtually every business in Korea—including the media business—must have close connections with the regime and the KCIA in particular. The business which requires foreign loans of foreign exchange absolutely must have KCIA approval at every turn.

In this respect, what draws my particular attention, because of its financial scope, is the vigorous and strange political activities in the United States of South Korean industrialist-evangelist Sun Myung Moon since Park had turned South Korea into a police state.

For instance, in 1973, Moon came to the United States and mounted a dynamic coast-to-coast campaign of the “Day of Hope” with full-page advertisements in the New York Times, the Washington Post, and other major dailies, proclaiming that: “At this moment in history, God has chosen Richard Nixon to be President of the United States * * *.”

Apparently bidding for favor, Moon proclaimed Watergate-besieged President Nixon as a leader by divine right; and later Moon was invited to the White House where he embraced Mr. Nixon.

Toward the end of 1973, and in the beginning of 1974, Moon crusaded in behalf of President Nixon with two evangelical themes of “Forgive, Love, Unite” and “God Loves Nixon” through full-page newspaper ads, mass rallies and street demonstrations in the United States, Europe, and the Far East.

Of course, the scene was repeated in South Korea. The point is that Moon staged massive demonstrations in Seoul where such rallies have been strictly banned by the “emergency decrees” of dictator Park.

The KCIA is involved in virtually every aspect of Korean life. Therefore, it is entirely unthinkable that the omnipresent KCIA simply overlooked Moon’s movement. On the contrary, the KCIA would be most interested in putting some Korean like Moon, who supports all of its goals, in a position to work and lobby for the Park regime’s position on the American political scene.

Indeed, as most Koreans know, Moon’s huge constellation of business enterprises in Korea and his cult have risen to a flourishing empire under the Park government, despite his early days of arrest on morals charges, controversy and scandalous reports in the leading Korean dailies.

Among many things, it is very strange to note that Moon operates, through his Unification Church-controlled Federation for Victory Over Communism, an anti-Communist indoctrination center for Korean Government employees and military officers.

By the KCIA’s unpublicized charter, however, this area of “anti-Communist indoctrination and internal propaganda” is explicitly

under the control of the KCIA's Second Bureau, which also controls the press with censors and supervising agents in each newspaper and broadcasting station.

For another thing, only in 1973, I learned from a calling card that Moon is the founder and chairman of the board of directors of the "Little Angels," Korean children's dance troupe, which has performed throughout the world as the officially endorsed emissary of the Park government.

But the "Little Angels" has always been a showcase exhibit of another organization in Washington, D.C., the Korean Cultural and Freedom Foundation of which the founder and president is now a retired lieutenant colonel of the Korean Army who was initially sent to South Korea's Washington Embassy as assistant military attaché, in 1961, by Park Chung Hee's military junta.

Recently, it became known that he is also an important member of Moon's Unification Church and his translator and constant traveling companion during his tours of the United States.

Another of the Korean Cultural and Freedom Foundation's few programs was then "Radio of Free Asia," which had no transmitter of its own, but used the Government-owned and Government-operated Korean Broadcasting System's transmission facility and its broadcasting time free of charge to beam its program to Vietnam.

I also remember that in 1970 or 1971 Park Chung Hee sent out a personal letter, signed on the government stationery as President of the Republic of Korea, to at least 60,000 prominent Americans, including many Senators, Congressmen, bankers, businessmen, et cetera, soliciting contributions for the Korean Cultural and Freedom Foundation, Inc.

It was also in this period that by sheer accident I came to know the Korean Cultural and Freedom Foundation had access to the South Korean Embassy's cable channel to Seoul which goes only to the Foreign Minister, Director of the KCIA, Prime Minister, or the President.

In Washington, D.C., there is another organization of which Moon is also the founder and chairman of the board, namely, the Freedom Leadership Foundation with which KCIA agents in the Korean Embassy maintained contact while I was still with the Embassy.

I remember at least three American secretaries in South Korea's Washington Embassy had been hired upon recommendations of the Freedom Leadership Foundation which furnished candidates at the request of the Embassy's KCIA agents.

When these not too visible links are viewed along with the strange political activities of Sun Myung Moon in the United States following Park's "Yushin" coup-in-office, there appears to be a curious working relationship between Park's dictatorial regime, Korean Cultural and Freedom Foundation, "Little Angels," Moon's Unification Church-affiliated organizations, and the KCIA—let alone dictator Park's patronage of Moon's multimillion dollar ventures in South Korea.

Since Park Chung Hee's power is essentially depended on his control mechanism, KCIA, and American aid, Park apparently intends to do everything from shameless to lawless for continued American

support. For that purpose, Park wants to use every corrupt and even repressive method in this country as he does in Korea.

Last September, the KCIA and Korean Consulate at Los Angeles covertly organized a group called the Friends of U.S. Senator Tunney and stage-managed a \$100-a-plate fundraising dinner for Senator John V. Tunney, who had not been sympathetic to Korean aid bills in the past.

Fortunately, the Los Angeles Korean weekly, *New Korea*, learned this conspiracy and informed the innocent victim, whereupon the Senator canceled the event.

Recently there were news reports on the FBI's investigation of allegations that two Congressmen accepted bribes from Park's government last year.

Maxine Cheshire reported in the *Washington Post* of February 19, 1976, that a member of the House Speaker's staff gave many parties for Congressmen and their wives at which a frequent guest was the Korean Embassy's KCIA station chief, Kim Young Hwan. The two Congressmen met KCIA station chief Kim through this member of the House Speaker's staff.

Judging from the detailed reports in the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times*, the KCIA appears to have well established contacts in the office of the House Speaker and the House Appropriations and Armed Services Committees, to say the least.

As I testified last summer, I knew Park's ambassador was trying to bribe American lawmakers. It was part of the KCIA's master plan, but there seems to be some other ways to tempt U.S. Congress.

Morton Kondracke reported in the *Chicago Sun-Times*, June 6, 1976, that dictator Park's officials extended to Congressman Don L. Bonker offers of a \$200 digital watch and "an attractive woman who would be pleased to meet with the Congressman on matters of mutual interest."

Of course, Congressman Bonker rejected the offers as the *Sun-Times* reported. He never saw the woman, and sent back the watch, left on his desk by the Korean Embassy's KCIA agent, Col. Choi Yae Heun, and National Assemblyman Ohm Young Dal.

By the way, this news article explains how the Park regime attempts to corrupt American lawmakers with wine, women, song, and gifts. But I will not go into the details as you can read it yourself.

But the Park's incredible attempts to buy off American leaders just do not stop there. The Park regime even attempted to purchase the Nixon White House in 1974.

According to the *Washington Post* of February 29, 1976, dictator Park's appointed National Assemblyman Row Chin Hwan made a "blanket" offer to a White House aide sometime before the August 9, 1974, resignation of President Nixon "to contribute to anyone in Congress recommended by the Nixon administration."

This report was confirmed by Mr. Ranard in his testimony last March;¹ therefore, I will not make any further comment on it.

¹ See testimony by Don Ranard in hearings entitled "Activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in the United States—Part I", Mar. 17, 1976, p. 11 and Mar. 25, 1976, p. 66.

If I sum up what I have observed, Park's KCIA agents and other officials are actively engaged in a vast clandestine operation of seduction, intimidation, threats, coercion, extortion, and bribery within the United States for the purpose of manipulating U.S. policy and legislation by purchasing American leaders in the Government, business and academia, and by suppressing the press and individuals who speak out.

Now what puzzles me most is the attitude of the U.S. Government, the administration in particular. There are strong indications that President Richard M. Nixon and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger tacitly consented to dictator Park's destruction of democratic institutions and human rights in South Korea, as Don Oberdorfer reported in the Washington Post on May 17, 1976.

In another article by John Saar, John Goshko, and Bill Richards—the Washington Post, May 23, 1976—also reported in this regard as follows, and I quote:

Many present and former State Department officials say privately that the tendency within the Department, particularly during the presidency of Richard M. Nixon, was "not to make too much noise" about the KCIA. One put it this way:

"You couldn't call it a coverup or anything like that. I never heard anyone say specifically that this is an area to stay away from. It was more that you sensed a lack of enthusiasm about pursuing complaints. The feeling seemed to be that we were dealing not with the Soviets and the KGB but with an important ally and that, like it or not, we had to avert our gaze a little bit."

With his first hand knowledge, Don Ranard made a similar reference to this attitude of the last two administrations in his testimony of March 17, 1976, before this committee.

Today, the Ford administration seems to carry on the same old Korea policy the Nixon administration had laid as the deeds indicate. For example, President Gerald Ford went to see Park in Seoul despite the strong protest from the democratic forces and foreign observers in South Korea. Moreover, he did not sneeze a word about human rights or democratic institutions while he was visiting Korea.

In early April this year, when 119 Members of Congress wrote a letter to President Ford advising him that "Since military power is directly associated with governmental control over the population, many Americans and Koreans suspect that U.S. military support somehow condones or even contributes to the long wave of repression, in the absence of strong public signals to the contrary from our Government," what did the President do? I have not seen such a signal up to this date.

Indeed, such attitude and policy of the U.S. Government has emboldened the Park regime to an incredible extent of even exporting his corrupt and repressive methods into the United States.

Hence, I cannot help but view these illegal activities of the KCIA agents and Park's other officials within the United States as a consequence of the current U.S. policy in regard to Park's dictatorial government.

In the same context, Mr. Chairman, I have profound admiration and deepest respect for your courage. For 3 consecutive years, against all these odds within your own Government, you have been almost

single-handedly carrying out your congressional responsibilities regarding this matter for what is right for the United States as well as for other countries like Korea.

I know the current administration has two prominent excuses for its inaction, repeated time and again in various public statements. First, South Korea's defense against the Communist North is important to the United States; second, U.S. policy is not to interfere with domestic affairs of other governments. I deplore this bureaucratic "nonspeaking" of Government spokesmen, which is even dishonest. Heaven knows these two statements are contradicting each other.

U.S. aid to Korea and presence of 42,000 American troops in South Korea are already a massive intervention in Korean affairs.

Destruction of democratic institutions and human rights in South Korea behind the American shield deprives South Koreans of their values and life style for which they would defend themselves against any Communist attack or subversion.

Therefore, the current U.S. policy is neither in the interest of U.S. security nor in the benefit of South Korean defense. Certainly, under any circumstances, it cannot be an excuse for not protecting U.S. citizens and residents from the harassment and other illegal activities of foreign agents within the United States.

Besides, speaking out against repression of human rights is surely not the kind of action the sensible "doctrine of noninterference" was intended to avoid. The administration is simply using it as an excuse to circumvent American responsibility to the United States own principles.

Hence, the current administration's policy regarding South Korea is not only dishonorable and inconsistent with American ideals, but also self-defeating.

Now I find it even discriminatory. Betraying his own words, the same U.S. policymaker loudly spoke out in Santiago de Chile 2 weeks ago, calling for human rights in Latin America.

Challenging violations of human rights in his host country, Chile, he declared that "the condition of human rights * * * has impaired our relationship with Chile and will continue to do so," and called for removal of the "obstacles raised by the conditions."

In order to help make his strong words more than lip service, the Ford administration is so far not seeking military aid for the anti-Communist Chilean junta, I repeat, is not seeking military aid for the anti-Communist Chilean junta, this year.

How commendable. I wholeheartedly support this policy. But what has he done to South Korea in the last 3 years while so many Americans and Koreans called for strong U.S. stand in support of human rights in South Korea?

Mr. Chairman, since the illegal activities of Dictator Park's KCIA and other officials within this country are in part consequences of the attitude and policy of the U.S. Government in regard to the Park regime as I have elaborated, I will begin my recommendations with regard to U.S. policy in South Korea.

The United States should adopt a no-nonsense approach to the violation of human rights with the Park regime.

Both publicly and privately, the United States should inform Park Chung Hee that it believes in protecting democracies and respecting human rights, and that if he does not do so, the United States would bow out of any commitment of U.S. troops, arms, grains, sales credits, or loans now being provided.

Just like Secretary Kissinger did in Chile, the United States should publicly spell out this stand while withholding U.S. aid until the Park regime cleans up its mess. Such a policy, both in words and in deeds, will also restore this country's credibility not only as a guardian of its own rights, but also a supporter of the human rights of others. This is not only ethically correct, but also pragmatically important for the United States to align itself with the legitimate aspirations of people everywhere.

Only so determined, the administration can seriously investigate and stamp out illegal activities of Park's KCIA agents, other officials, and their companion collaborators in this country. As for specific action to accompany the above policy, I also submit the following recommendations:

The Secretary of State in a strongest possible diplomatic means of formal communication inform the Korean Government that it will not permit the present role and conduct of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in the United States.

In so doing, the Secretary of State should make emphatically clear to the Korean Government that the only acceptable function of the KCIA in the United States is intelligence liaison with its U.S. counterparts, and that intelligence liaison representatives may be assigned only to the Korean Embassy in Washington, D.C.

The Department of State should set a limit on the number of such intelligence representatives it is prepared to accredit, prohibiting the assignment of intelligence personnel to any of the Korean consulates in the United States.

The substance of such expression and communication to the Korean Government should be made public.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation should make a serious and thorough investigation into the alleged clandestine operations and intelligence activities of the Korean Government, as well as the activities of Koreans suspected of having repressive aims, in the United States.

The Department of Justice should make sure that all organizations and individuals in the United States which receive their support directly or indirectly from the Korean Government sources be registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

The Internal Revenue Service should make certain that the total revenue of such organizations and individuals is properly reported.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you very much, Dr. Lee. We will hold questions until we have heard from the next two witnesses.

Our next witness this afternoon is Mr. Robert W. Roland.

Mr. Roland, please you raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give the committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. ROLAND. I do.

Mr. FRASER. We are pleased to have you here, Mr. Roland. Will you proceed please.

**STATEMENT OF ROBERT W. ROLAND, PRIVATE CITIZEN,
LAS VEGAS, NEV.**

Mr. ROLAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

So that my interest before the committee be known, suffice it to say that my former wife of 25 years has been a Sun Myung Moon devotee since 1963. Additionally, she has in the past year or so influenced our 22-year-old daughter into that same cult. My daughter, at the present time, serves Moon in the Washington, D.C., area as a full-time, unpaid public relations worker. I have custody of the two younger children.

Apart from the personal impact of family involvement, there are, however, other factors which cause me deep concern. Like all of the oppressed people of the world, I would take little comfort in the political ideology of my oppressor. I detest totalitarian repression in any guise, be it Fascist or Communist.

Again, I am very much afraid that our Government is so soon repeating in South Korea the very same mistake it made in South Vietnam. Rather than strengthening the forces of democracy, we shall, quite the contrary, weaken the resolve of the South Korean people to resist communism.

The facts and conclusions contained in this statement stem from a very close association with the top Moon cadre from February 1963 until April 1965, and a continuing investigation of the movement until the present. I am fully aware of the scope of this hearing and my remarks, as much as possible, shall be so related.

It must be understood, however, that Moon's relationship with the Government of South Korea cannot be divorced from his related political activities here in the United States and elsewhere.

My first contact with the Moon movement came in late February of 1963 through a brief introduction to Lt. Col. Pak Bo Hi, then assistant military attaché at the Korean Embassy.

Shortly after that first encounter, Pak contacted me on two occasions extending a dinner invitation at this home in Arlington, Va. It was at this affair that we first met Rhee Jhoon, a Moon devotee and an active proselytizer here on Capitol Hill over the past years.

From that first meeting until early July we became the closest of friends with the Pak family and Rhee. During this period there was not a hint of their connection with Moon's movement, though we were together on numerous occasions.

About April, in a casual conversation with Colonel Pak, I asked: "What are the duties of an assistant military attaché?"

He responded by outlining his routine Embassy and diplomatic functions, and in the course of the conversation noted that he served as liaison between South Korean and U.S. intelligence services. During this discussion on the particular point, he made mention of the National Security Agency and its location at Fort Meade, Md.

I had never heard of such an agency and I confessed my ignorance to Pak. He went on to explain that NSA dealt primarily with code work and the monitoring of radio transmissions. My mental impression

of this conversation was deepened when a short time later I took my first notice of NSA in public print.

I once remarked to Colonel Pak that he often seemed very tired and overworked. He then told me that he usually slept 3 or 4 hours a night. I came to understand such lack of sleep when I later learned that he was serving both the cause of the Korean Government and the cause of Moon.

On several occasions I inquired as to how his workday had gone, and in response he would mention his various activities for the day and then casually remark that he had had to drive all the way out to Fort Meade. At that point in time, I attached no importance to such remarks and it would be some months before I did.

Every affair which we attended in the Pak home consisted of other invited guests. However, in early July of 1963, we were invited to dinner and my wife and I were the only guests present. Jhoon Rhee resided in the Pak home and was present along with Pak's wife. Following dinner and after much verbal and emotional preparation, Pak revealed their connection with Moon and the messianic nature of the movement.

Of course, many questions followed from sheer curiosity, one of which concerned the marital status of this self-proclaimed messiah. Pak reluctantly admitted to Moon's marriage in 1960 at the age of 40. I followed with the most obvious question under the circumstances, and inquired if Moon had remained celibate prior to his marriage.

With the most convincing sincerity, Pak nodded his head and said, "Yes, most pure virgin." It was not until late 1967 that I discovered Moon's earlier marriage in 1944. This was but the first of many lies and deceptions that followed. In my 13 years of observation, this tactic of "heavenly deceit" underlies the entire movement, from the top echelon to the lowest.

Today, spokesmen for Moon vehemently deny any connection with the Park Chung Hee regime. Yet, in late 1963, Colonel Pak told me that he personally knew President Park and had met him on a number of occasions.

He further told me directly and implied numerous times that their movement was looked upon with favor by the South Korean Government. In spite of this high-level connection, he once told me that Colonel "Blank," I do not remember his name, a military attaché, was giving him a difficult time for neglecting his embassy duties because of his Moon efforts.

He went on to say that this colonel was the only one in the embassy who resisted his efforts on behalf of Moon, and this stemmed from the the colonel's personal dislike for Pak. Pak continued by saying he would get Moon's work done if it meant working 24 hours a day.

Pak indicated that his primary aim was to establish influential contacts with the governmental and social elite of the Nation's Capital. This he has done very effectively as we have other Moon leaders in various capitals of the world, particularly in Tokyo and Taipei.

Jhoon Rhee indicated that his position as a karate master would serve to influence, finance, and recruit in the furtherance of the Moon cause. Only one has to look around this city of Washington and even here on Capitol Hill to know just how successful Rhee has been.

Almost daily around this country, in the pressured environs of the Moon commune, young, prospective converts are strongly swayed when shown a photograph of Moon posing with Senators Kennedy, Humphrey, et cetera, or shown a copy of a telegram from Ichord, Proxmire, and Ervin.

Moon's brief meeting with President Nixon in February of 1974, gave impetus to the subtle propaganda in Korea and Japan that Nixon was a full supporter of Moon and his cause.

By late 1963, I began to detect the political aspects of Moon's movement which I found disturbing. Often I would chide Colonel Pak for his naive belief that such a movement could manipulate the world's varied political systems into accepting Moon as their political messiah. Such discussions became rather intense at times.

On one such occasion Pak spoke of the eventual reunification of the Korean peninsula, under Moon's dominion, as a foregone conclusion. All of the peninsula represented the "New Israel" and must be the first to fall under Moon's rule.

I took strong exception to his wild assertion and in a moment of anger he blurted:

If necessary, I can envision Divine Principle Soldiers crossing the 38th parallel fully armed.

With this I retorted:

Thus far you have my wife believing that God condones lies and deceit to achieve your aims, now you want her to believe that God sanctions killing.

In regard to the importance which Moon attaches to the Korean peninsula, it is interesting to read just a few of their many proclamations. I quote here from a Moon training manual which the devotees are told to guard with their lives:

Due to the victory of the messiah, the solution of the Korean peninsula is near at hand [page 100]. This is the time to decide the destiny of mankind. The final decision must be made in Korea again [page 104]. The government of Korea knows very well that it is only the Unification Church that can save Korea.

In early 1964, Colonel Pak told of his plans to form the Korean Cultural and Freedom Foundation. He stated that the purpose of the KCFF would be to gain influence and raise money for Moon's cause.

When I questioned the legality of transferring such funds, he failed to respond, but merely shrugged. He went on to form KCFF in late 1964 and secured Adm. Arleigh Burke as its first head.

The original list of sponsors reads like the Who's Who of Washington politics. But I am confident that not one of those sponsors was aware of the true nature of the organization. The 1974 report of foundations lists 140,000 contributors to KCFF, and its income is reported as well in excess of \$1 million.

About the same time, Pak spoke of forming a broadcasting network patterned after Radio Free Europe. Radio Free Asia, an adjunct of KCFF, came into being in 1966. In October 1970, 60,000 letters were mailed to prospective contributors bearing this endorsement from Park Chung Hee:

From the inception of Radio Free Asia in 1966, I have given my hearty support to this project. The Korean government was then, as it is today, privileged to lease our Broadcast facilities to Radio Free Asia.

In 1971-72, KCFF and RFA came under investigation by Justice and State Departments for possible violations of the Foreign Agents Registration Act. The Moon organizations retained the legal services of Robert Amory, Jr., former Deputy Director of Operations for our own CIA. Eventually, as one newspaper reported, "Amory won the day for KCFF." Nothing further came of that particular investigation, as I have been able to determine.

In early 1964, Colonel Pak also told me of a group of young Korean children undergoing training in Korea under the direction of a noted Korean dancer. Before they ever set foot on stage their name was decided upon. They would be known as the Little Angels.

These lovely and talented children have been used most effectively around the world for the enhancement of Moon's prestige. Their influence has been immeasurable, and I suspect that many have been led into the cult environs by their innocent charms.

On June 7, 1976, I was informed that Colonel Pak was in Las Vegas where the Little Angels were performing with Liberace at the Hilton Hotel. A contact who attended that evening's performance reported that an oriental, who could have fit the description of either Colonel Pak or Mr. Kim, who travels with the Little Angels, announced that the Little Angels had been invited to the White House on July 4 by President and Mrs. Ford to celebrate our Bicentennial year.

A subsequent denial of such an invitation by the White House brought to an end those announcements by Pak or Kim. Instead, Liberace makes the announcement personally. Tape recordings of the announced invitation were made on the night of June 10 and 13. Again, I feel sure that Mr. Liberace does not know of the Little Angels' connection with the Moon group.

While the KCFF and Radio Free Asia have received the glowing accolades of the Park regime, and the Little Angels are designated as official emissaries of the South Korean Government, yet both Moon and Park steadfastly deny any relationship whatever.

Then, in 1971 several Moon organizations signed a large contract with a Washington, D.C., printing firm, running into thousands of dollars. My present wife was in charge of accounting at the firm, which is called Colortone Creative Graphics, Inc.

Colonel Pak met with the head of that company personally to work out the details of that business arrangement. When Park Chung Hee decided to publish his book "To Build a Nation" in 1971, he did not select one of the larger publishing houses, but rather selected the same and rather obscure printing house in Washington, D.C. It seems a rather striking coincidence to me, and it would be interesting to determine who put who in touch with whom.

I became aware of KCIA harassment of Korean emigres in June of 1967 and wrote a letter of protest to our State Department to which they never replied.

A total of 17 Koreans, mostly students, were kidnaped from West Germany, France, and the United States. Along with other dissidents, they were placed on trial in South Korea, and on October 9, 1967, all received prison terms with the exception of two; they were executed.

Since that time, I have gathered material on KCIA activities; particularly those carried on in the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Over the years I have interviewed numerous members of the Moon organization regarding the brutal repression of the Park government. Without exception they defended every brutal and unjust act.

Their fear of communism is all consuming. My former wife defended Park on the grounds that it would keep the Communists from taking over in Los Angeles and San Francisco. My daughter writes that she believes that the Soviet KGB, the Secret Police, is watching her.

Yet, in light of such irrational fear, they readily accept Moon's paradoxical decree that: "It will be an act of mercy toward the Russian people to kill Communists." However, "You must be ready to marry Russian Communists if necessary."

Young Americans who have spent 2 or more years in the cult and have served Moon in South Korea, have told me of signing a pledge to fight for the "Fatherland" in the event of a war. The same such accounts have come from former members of the Moon organization in France, West Germany, and Japan.

According to my Korean contact, a Seoul police officer, who was a member of Moon's cult, acted as liaison between Moon and the Blue House for a period of 10 years. He defected from the cause in 1974 and told his story to a Korean investigator.

He named a Major Han, who at that time was chief interpreter at the Blue House, as a member of the Moon movement. I do not know if this is the same "Colonel" Han who has been recently serving the Moon cause here in the United States. That Seoul police officer has not been seen again, though contacts have been attempted.

In July 1967, Moon held an organizational meeting at Lake Yamana, near Mount Fuji, for the purpose of organizing the World Anti-Communist League. According to my Japanese sources, two prominent figures at that meeting were Yoshio Kodama and Ryoichi Sasagawa, powerful leaders in the extreme rightwing of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party.

Kodama, a staunch supporter of Chung Hee Park, is currently under indictment in the Japanese Lockheed case. Kodama's close associate, Sasagawa, headed Genri Undo, the Japanese arm of the Unification Church in the late 1960's.

WACL was formed in Korea in January 1968. Former Japanese Prime Minister Kishi joined Kodama and Sasagawa in forming the Japanese branch of WACL in April 1968. Kishi has been an open and staunch supporter of Moon's International Federation for Victory Over Communism, and his U.S.-based Freedom Leadership Foundation.

All three of these organizations have been closely linked in their worldwide anti-Communist efforts. As of late, however, some of the Moon leadership have been stating that IFVOC has broken with WACL.

In 1974, Sasagawa formed the World Karate Federation and became its first president with Jhoon Rhee, coincidentally, as one of his officers.

Across the country and around the world the Moon organization operates numerous front groups. As much as possible these groups seek to obscure their affiliation with Moon, but in most, if not all of these groups, Moon's cadre are in control.

In the very recent past the Diplomat National Bank began business in Washington, D.C. I understand there are 351 stockholders, 19 of which are identifiable as connected with the Moon organization. Public shares outstanding total 80,000, with 42,820 shares held by the Moon group. This represented \$1,070,000 of the \$2 million capitalization. I think that this has recently been adjusted, and there may be a change in these figures, and another 17,000 stockholders have appeared.

The presence of Moon's cadre on Capitol Hill is a well publicized fact. One such young lady succeeded in establishing a close friendship with the Speaker of the House.

February newsmedia reports told of an FBI investigation into an alleged bribery involving two U.S. Congressmen and a South Korean lady working in Congressman Albert's office.

The reports told of her frequent trips to Korea with congressional delegations and her association with Kim Yung Hwan, alleged to be the ranking KCIA agent in this country. An investigative reporter, with whom I have been cooperating for some months, Stewart Hawkins, stated to me that this Korean lady had frequented the Moon center at 1611 Upshur Street in Washington.

From my intimate knowledge of the Moon group, I know that the sole aim of his followers is the furtherance of his cause. Whether here on Capitol Hill, or with Muhammad Ali in Japan, Rhee Jhoon's goal is focused on Moon. Whenever anything or anyone becomes a liability or is used up, they will be cast aside. I have no doubt that when Park Chung Hee becomes such a liability to Moon, Moon will totally disassociate himself, and I am equally sure that Park will do the same thing, but as of yet the scales have not tipped in that direction.

Influence and power is what Moon wants. In 1974 he said:

Unless we are powerful, we cannot save this Nation (the United States). Perhaps in 3 years Senators will come to take our State Representatives to their place in luxurious cars, and they will put themselves at his disposal. That is what is happening in Korea.

And that is what Moon is striving for here in the United States.

The contention that Moon may clothe his every deceptive and questionable act in the protective provisions of the first amendment is ludicrous. In a case involving the religious protection of the first amendment of last September, the Tennessee Supreme Court stated:

The right to believe is absolute; the right to act is subject to reasonable regulation designed to protect a compelling state interest.

In March of this year the United States Supreme Court let that ruling stand.

The torture, brutality, and repression of human rights in the nation of South Korea is an indisputable fact of reality. Multitudes are crying out to be free, and that cry would rise like thunder if it were not for the strangling arm of Park's KCIA.

Last year this Congress voted \$323 million for the Park regime. This year a proposed \$431 million is in the budget. Now I do not suggest that we can make policy, or interfere in the internal affairs of another nation; but we do not have to aid and abet the tyrant in his continuing oppression of basic human rights.

In this year of our Bicentennial, when the word "Freedom" is ringing loud throughout this land, let us not stand silent nor finance the slavery of others.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Roland.

There is a vote in progress, and we will have to recess the committee for about 10 minutes.

[Whereupon, a short recess was taken.]

Mr. FRASER. The subcommittee will resume its hearing.

Our third witness for the day is Mr. Allen Tate Wood. If you will rise and raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you give to this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. WOOD. I do.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you. Mr. Wood, we are delighted to have you here. If you will please proceed.

STATEMENT OF ALLEN TATE WOOD, FORMER PRESIDENT, FREEDOM LEADERSHIP FOUNDATION

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Chairman, everybody who has come today, and members of the press: I am delighted to be here. I am delighted to be given the opportunity to testify. I would like to read a short piece that I wrote for today.

From March to December of 1970, I, Allen Tate Wood, was the president of the Freedom Leadership Foundation. This foundation is legally constituted as a nonprofit educational corporation, whose purpose is to educate young Americans about the dangers of communism.

This corporation, which I shall hereafter refer to as FLF, was founded in Washington, D.C., in 1969 by Neil Albert Salonen in response to a command given by Sun Myung Moon.

Moon said that it was time to begin the anti-Communist work in America. At that time the Unification Church in Korea and in Japan had already begun extensive anti-Communist campaigns under the aegis of its political arm the International Federation for the Extermination of Communism, later modified to its present more palatable name, the International Federation for Victory Over Communism.

The critical asset which qualified me to serve as president of FLF was that I was a dedicated member of the Unification Church. I was chosen to carry out the responsibilities of that office by Miss Kim Young Oon, the founder of the Unification Church, and by Neil Salonen, who is current president of the Unification Church of America and, if I am not mistaken, the current president of FLF.

During the spring of 1970, we learned that the Japanese branch of the International Federation for Victory Over Communism was to sponsor and host the Fourth Annual Conference of WACL, the World Anti-Communist League in Kyoto, Japan.

I and eight other members of the American Unification Church attended the WACL Conference. We were told by Mr. Osami Kuboki, the president of the IFVC and the Japanese Unification Church that the central purpose of the WACL Conference from the church's perspective was to win the friendship and trust of the South Korean Government.

In those days, we were often told that there was some danger that Mr. Moon might be assassinated by agents of the South Korean Government. To prevent this from happening, the Unification Church in Korea and Japan was engaging in an all out effort to convince President Park that he had nothing to fear from Moon, and that, in fact, in Moon he would find his strongest ally and supporter.

So far Moon's staunch anticommunism has won him at least the unspoken blessings of the Park regime. Today in Korea, a land in which the free expression of religious conscience is often met by the government with charges of treason and sedition, Moon and his lieutenants enjoy a kind of diplomatic immunity. To what may we attribute this singular freedom?

After the WACL Conference, I went to Korea to meet Mr. Moon. During the course of several sessions with Moon in the next week, he outlined to us his plans for America. The gist of it was that through the Unification Church, and its numerous front organizations, Moon wanted to acquire enough influence in America, so that he would be able to dictate policy on major issues, to influence legislation and move into electoral politics.

Of paramount importance was the issue of guaranteeing unlimited American military assistance to South Korea in the event of the break-out of hostilities between North and South Korea.

While in Korea we were given a tour of the Korean CIA headquarters. We were shown pictures of North Korean assassins, and other police trophies. It was understood among us that it was important to win the friendship and trust of this organization specifically.

Whether or not the Unification Church is somehow the tool or agent of the KCIA, I really cannot say. Whatever the connection, their political goals in this country overlap so thoroughly as to display no difference at all.

There are several questions I would like to address to the Members of Congress.

How is it that Mr. Moon is able to bring 500 to 1,000 aliens into the country on tourist visas; aliens whose sole occupation here consists of fundraising to subsidize Moon's religious, political, and financial ventures. This fundraising violates the law of the land. More often than not, it is carried out under false pretenses. Are you aware that your constituents are being defrauded into sponsoring the dreams of a man who tells his mesmerized followers that God is about to phase out democracy?

Did you know that Mr. Moon, on occasion, has told his followers that it would be better for them to commit suicide than fail in their responsibility to him?

Did you know that Mr. Moon has told his followers that if he fails, they should march into the sea?

I would like to end my statement here, and simply answer questions.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Wood.

Professor Lee, you mentioned receiving a letter signed by a high ranking South Korean mission official regarding the method by which the KCIA subsidizes pro-Park communications media.

Would you be willing to provide, on a confidential basis, a copy of that letter to the subcommittee?

Mr. LEE. Yes, on a confidential basis, I am willing to do so. In fact, I brought the letter right here with me.

Mr. DERWINSKI. What is the reason for this confidential nature? I recall that this morning you were most interested in having open discussion of the agenda item. Why this sudden confidentiality? What is the inconsistency?

Mr. FRASER. Perhaps, Mr. Derwinski, if you had been here throughout the hearing, you would have a better understanding of what the item is about. I will be glad to explain it to you.

Mr. DERWINSKI. I want to point out that I was on the floor of the House, helping pass the foreign aid conference report, which included the amendments overwhelmingly adopted by the House, which has the proper military funding for South Korea. So I was really doing something that you supported.

I have read all the statements. There are a number of allegations in the statement by Mr. Lee. If there is truth to them, I would like to have it on the record. Obviously, I will abide by the confidentiality, but why the confidence?

Mr. FRASER. Professor Lee, perhaps you should answer that question.

Mr. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I will be delighted to respond to the question of the gentleman from Cook County, Ill., I suppose. The nature of this information, given to me by this person, is confidential; and I have the responsibility to protect this gentleman's safety, since he is an insider who provided this information to me in writing with his confidence in myself.

If I reveal his name in public, perhaps even his life will be in jeopardy. I am interested in his human rights. That is what I have been doing. Therefore, I cannot reveal his name in public. But I am willing to provide that letter on a confidential basis.

Mr. DERWINSKI. What will we do with this confidential letter, Mr. Chairman? Will we file it top secret and file it somewhere?

Mr. FRASER. Perhaps, Professor Lee, you should keep the letter. We will not receive it.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Unless it was to be in the record, I would just as soon Mr. Lee keep it.

Mr. FRASER. I think that this is the best course. We will not ask that the letter be provided.

In your letter, Professor Lee, you mention 1970 or 1971, you learned that the Korean Cultural and Freedom Foundation had access to the Embassy's cable channel to the highest levels of the South Korean Government. Could you elaborate on that specifically?

Who were the members of the Korean Culture and Freedom Foundation who had access to these facilities, and how did you know this?

Mr. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I think that I would rather explain exactly how it happened.

One day, I was discussing a matter with the Ambassador in his office. In the middle of our conversation, one of the Embassy's communications officers walked in, and he imparted to the Ambassador that he had received a message from Col. Pak Bo Hi, and this message was to be sent to Seoul.

The Ambassador turned to him and listened to his report, and he simply nodded. The Embassy's communications officer walked out of the office, and we resumed the conversation. So it was just by sheer accident that I came to know that he had access to the diplomatic cable channels.

It seemed casual. The Ambassador listened, and he nodded. It was like routine business.

Mr. FRASER. Pak Bo Hi at that time was what?

Mr. LEE. He was the president of the Korean Cultural and Freedom Foundation.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know of any instances in which ostensibly private citizens had access to the Embassy's communications facilities?

Mr. LEE. No, sir. In my almost 9 or 10 years of overseas service with the Embassy here in Washington, and previously in Paris, France, I had not seen anything like this before.

It is a matter of common sense. No private person has access to diplomatic pouches, or diplomatic cable channel. No, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Was this cable, or communication link, considered to be a routine communications setup, or was it a highly secret channel?

Mr. LEE. The diplomatic channel is always secret. It may not be coded all the time. Certain messages are coded, but other messages are not coded. But no one other than authorized personnel had access to it. It is specifically for that purpose that it is secret.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Wood, you left the presidency of the Freedom Leadership Foundation in December of 1970, according to your statement?

Mr. WOOD. December of 1973. I left the Unification Church in December of 1973, that is correct.

Mr. FRASER. What were the circumstances of your leaving as the head of the Freedom Leadership Foundation?

Mr. WOOD. The circumstances were personal circumstances. There was warfare among the leadership of the church, and I was a younger member and more able to be sacrificed sort of back into the ranks. There were people in the church who opposed my being demoted, but I was glad to leave the position.

Mr. FRASER. Based on your statement and your testimony, during 1970, I would gather that it would not be a fair conclusion that some of Reverend Moon's activities were being directly sponsored by the KCIA. If anything, they were worried about the Government?

Mr. WOOD. That is what we were led to believe. We were led to believe by the church leaders that Moon's position was a difficult one, and it was a crucial time, and we had to sort of thread the needle before a certain date. If we did that, then we would have Park's friendship. This was the whole goal of the IFVC in Korea and Japan, it was to stave off Park's feeling that Moon was a rival.

After the WACL Conference, and after what the church considered to be a raging success of this event in Japan, Mr. Kaboki, who was the

president of the Japanese Church visited President Park in Korea and had a personal interview with him. He, apparently, succeeded in winning Park's friendship.

Mr. FRASER. On the last page of your statement, you ask several questions. One is that you assert, in effect, that aliens have been brought into the United States whose sole occupation consists of fundraising to subsidize Moon's financial, political, and religious ventures.

Would you enlarge on what role you are talking about here?

Mr. WOOD. The role of these aliens?

Mr. FRASER. Yes.

Mr. WOOD. I know that in the spring of 1972, Mr. Moon told us that he was going to bring Japanese into the country and Germans and Englishmen, and people from other countries. I think that by about September of 1972, there were approximately 400 Japanese who had come to this country on tourist or visitors visas.

At the time, I was living in Maryland, working in Upper Marlboro. I was a church official there, and we had a small candle factory. We produced candles to the tune of about 2,000 to 3,000 a day. We would sell these to church centers around the country at cost, which was about 40 cents a piece.

They would then sell them door-to-door for 400 or 500 percent profit.

Mr. Moon took the Japanese members of the church and held them up to the rest of the church as the example of how dedicated followers should raise money. Up in Belvedere there were 200 to 300 of these Japanese there, and they were going out every single day from dawn to dusk, actually much past dusk, selling these candles.

They would raise, sometimes, \$10,000 to \$15,000 in a day. None of that money ever went into a bank. It was never recorded anywhere. One of the reasons that I know this is because when they paid us for the candles that we delivered to them, they never paid us in a check.

Sometimes they would send a van down to Maryland with 250 pounds of coins in it, to pay us for the candles that we had sent them.

I spoke with a man by the name of Mr. Kamiyama, who was the leader of the Japanese Unification Church members in the country. I asked him: "What do you do with the money?"

He said, "We keep it here."

I said, "You don't put it in the bank?"

He said, "No."

I said, "You are a Japanese pirate."

He said, "Yes, I am Japanese pirate for Mr. Moon."

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Derwinski.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to say, at this point, partially in self-defense, that I am not a member of Reverend Moon's church. I am a practicing Roman Catholic. My interest in this issue is as a Member of Congress and not as a philosopher or a student of religious sects.

Mr. WOOD, if I could refer to your closing paragraph, when you, in effect, directed questions to Members of Congress what I am interested in is something beyond allegations, something beyond the charges, something to substantiate.

For example, if you are asking us, as you did in your statement, how has Mr. Moon been able to bring 500 to 1,000 aliens into the country, it would be helpful if you would be more specific.

Was it more like 501, or 499, 999, or 750? If you claim to know as much as you do, why can't you be more specific than using figures as far apart as 500 to 1,000?

Mr. WOOD. I know specifically that Mr. Moon told us that by a certain date, and I don't remember the date, but it was sometime in 1972, in the summer toward the end of 1972, we will have 400 Japanese members here. He said: "I will also bring members from other countries."

I met 30 to 50 Germans. I met that many Frenchmen. I met 15 or 16 Italian men. I met people from Ireland, and from all over Europe.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Presuming that these people, no matter where they came from, had legitimately obtained tourist visas, and intended to return—they weren't going to become illegal aliens—then if it is assumed that their behavior was consistent with our immigration laws, what is the issue, what is the charge?

Mr. WOOD. I think the issue is very difficult because we get into the definition of words, and is the Unification Church a church? It is my contention that it is certainly not a church. It is certainly a political organization which clearly has partisan objectives.

It summons the members of its world congregation to the United States to carry out its partisan political policies. One of the ways that it does this, is that it raises money under false pretenses by knocking on your door, and saying: "We are here to raise money for a drug program in Iowa, and we like Americans. We think that democracy is great." Your wife says: "That is nice. Let me buy 16. Do you have any frangipane?"

It is a lie, and I think that it should be exposed as that.

Mr. DERWINSKI. We have to make the rollcall, but again let me say that I am not interested in defending the Unification Church. If Mr. Wood is accurate, we should have some eminent theologian testify and analyze whether this is a proper sect or not; whether what they are doing is in violation of our IRS laws, or in violation of interstate laws or banking laws should be reviewed.

Let us use the proper agencies of Government, but at least make specific charges and name names, identify bank accounts, and be concrete in your charges, instead of limiting it to allegations. Whatever they are doing wrong, let us throw the book at them.

I know nothing about this church and am totally disinterested in its philosophy. I am very happy with my church and have no intention of becoming a convert to the Moon sect.

So with that, I think that we could come back after our vote.

Mr. FRASER. We will recess now, while we go and vote.

[Whereupon, a short recess was taken.]

Mr. FRASER. You mentioned that Adm. Arleigh Burke was the first head of the KCFF.

Mr. ROLAND. When I found out that Admiral Burke had taken over as the head of KCFF, I called Admiral Burke on the telephone, and told him about the connection. I never heard any more about Admiral Burke, but it was at about that time that he left KCFF.

Mr. FRASER. Did Colonel Pak return to South Korea after KCFF was formed?

Mr. ROLAND. Yes; Colonel Pak made trips to Korea, but I don't know that he returned on an extended basis.

Mr. FRASER. Was there one occasion that you recall in which he may have left the United States to go back to South Korea, in which he talked about the possibility of returning?

Mr. ROLAND. My understanding is that when he resigned from the Korean Army, he was going to stay in this country as the full head of KCFF. He did take a trip back to Korea at that time, and then he came back. I am not even sure, I do not know at this point what Colonel Pak's status is in this country, whether he is here on a resident visa, or what.

Mr. FRASER. Did you have occasion to talk to him after he returned?

Mr. ROLAND. Yes, this was about the time that Mr. Moon came here in March of 1965, and it was about the time when I broke my former wife's relationship with the group. This was in the fall of 1965, and this was the last conversation. Then, I met Colonel Pak at an airport and said hello, but that was it.

Mr. FRASER. You said that Colonel Pak spoke of forming Radio Free Asia. When did he mention this?

Mr. ROLAND. He never mentioned the words "Radio Free Asia," but the context in which he spoke to me during that discussion, they were going to form a radio operation similar to Radio Free Europe, and they would broadcast throughout Asia. He did not specifically say Southeast Asia, as it turned out.

Mr. FRASER. How did the subject happen to be brought out, do you recall?

Mr. ROLAND. Just in conversation. Some of these things began very casually, because you have to understand that we were very good friends the first 4 or 5 months of my relationship. Then, I had a very pertinent interest in what went on after that, because from that night in July of 1963 my former wife was a Moon follower. The changes that I was seeing, I did not like. An outsider would never get any information.

Mr. FRASER. How do you know of Colonel Pak's association with the printers who subsequently printed President Pak's book?

Mr. ROLAND. At that time, I had been involved in this thing for about 9 years. I had met my present wife. Of course at that time, she knew nothing of my particular involvement with this Moon investigation, but after some months, after we became closer she worked with me on a drug program that we were operating in Reston, Va., among young people. I disclosed this to her.

She was at that time the manager of the accounting department at what we call Colortone Press, or Colortone Creative Graphics, Inc. For almost 2 years, she was the manager of accounting there. It was during this time that she said: "I remember seeing accounts." So she checked some of the accounts of the Moon organization, and recalled the time when Colonel Pak met with the president of that company, Mr. Al Hackle.

Mr. FRASER. Professor, you stated in your testimony that businesses that require foreign loans or foreign exchange absolutely must have KCIA approval at every turn. Could you describe that in greater detail?

Mr. LEE. Yes, sir. In Korea, if any business wants to use foreign exchange, or needs foreign loans, the Government has to guarantee. Otherwise, the business cannot get the loan from a foreign financial or banking organization. Therefore, they apply for such governmental guarantee. They file the application with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. This is their normal procedure.

However, it is not the Ministry of Commerce and Industry which has final say. The organization or the authority which has the final say in this matter is the KCIA. So every time you turn in your application, anything to do with a foreign loan, or even a foreign exchange purchase from the bank, that is the procedure.

Therefore, without the KCIA's approval, you cannot have either foreign loans or foreign exchange purchases.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Derwinski.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I am concerned with the efforts trying to tie the Unification Church to the Government of South Korea. As I understand the situation, and as I indicated earlier, I disclaim any special theological or philosophical knowledge, but I know of a number of organizations of Christian-Oriental combinations. If it were not for his notoriety, Reverend Moon would be just another individual with a less than major religious group.

The issue here is the criticism before this subcommittee of the Government in Korea. I have a story from the New York Times of May 27, in which South Korean officials specifically deny any links to the Moon sect.

Since the New York Times is very often quoted as gospel, I use it, when they are correct. In this particular case, if I read the story carefully, it was a special to the New York Times which has a statement by the Deputy Minister of Culture and Information.

For the record, I would like to insert the full article but the specific statement is as follows, and I quote: "We have no connection whatsoever with Moon."

I understand that the Reverend Moon is also an industrialist, and that may be one of the sources of his wealth as well. But as I understand the situation, profits from his operations are substantial in the United States and other countries, and he is funneling funds back to Korea, rather than living off of funds from Korea.

So I would think that it would be easier to charge that he was using his sect to support the Government of Korea, rather than charging that the Government of South Korea was subsidizing his church.

For the record, I would like to insert that one article.¹

Then, there was a reference made before the committee, and if I may insert into the record at this point an article in the Oregonian of June 10, which discusses this allegation of a gift to Representative Bonker, a colleague.

The reason that I ask that this be inserted in the record is that Mr. Bonker himself is quoted in this article as saying that he did not construe the offers as bribes, though he believes that it is improper for Members of Congress to accept any gratuities from foreign emissaries. That, of course, is a proper position.

¹ See appendix 5, p. 76.

I think that this issue, which was originally a Chicago Sun-Times story, did not have enough sources that could be substantiated. Mr. Bonker is again quoted in this article as saying that this episode had been terribly exaggerated. I think that for the sake of the record this correction should be made.

Mr. FRASER. You want those in the record.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Without objection, they will be accepted in the record.¹

Mr. DERWINSKI. The only point I have. I would like to go back to the statement by Mr. Lee which has to do with NBC. Having voted against the congressional investigation of Daniel Schoor on the ground of censorship, I am a bit concerned by the statement by Professor Lee that NBC had corrected certain news broadcasts "and knowing the vested interest in South Korea of the NBC's sister company, RCA. I would like to find out if there was an invisible hand of the Park regime behind the NBC's making of this reverse correction."

I would think, Mr. Chairman, that we ought to ask an appropriate official of NBC or RCA to appear before this committee, if they wish to dignify those charges, and explain what their policy is, because this is a serious charge against a very reputable news organization.

Beyond that, again disclaiming any interest, membership, direct or indirect in the Moon sect, and disclaiming any knowledge of seductive activities in Washington by the KCIA, I think that the material before us is in the form of allegations, and a repeat of previous unsubstantiated charges. I have no other questions.

Mr. FRASER. You have no other questions this afternoon?

Mr. DERWINSKI. No, sir.

Mr. LEE. Mr. Chairman, with regard to the statement which Mr. Derwinski has just made, may I, for the sake of the record, make a few comments?

Mr. FRASER. Surely, go ahead.

Mr. LEE. With your permission, I would like to include a correction in the record that Mr. Derwinski said a link between the Unification Church and the Korean Government is what the testimony is trying to establish, is erroneous.

I don't believe that this is an intentional error, but I wish to make it emphatically clear that what I have stated here in this regard was seemingly an apparent link between Moon's political organizations and their political activities and the Korean Government and its KCIA operations in the United States.

It is not the same thing as a link between the Unification Church and the Korean Government. Apparently Mr. Derwinski misunderstood this point in my statement.

When I delivered the statement, you were not here, Mr. Derwinski. Perhaps you did not hear what I was saying. It is not the link or relationship between the church and the Government. What I am talking about is a relationship between the political activities by Sun Myung Moon and the Park regime.

Mr. DERWINSKI. I read your testimony and reading is an easier way to nail down inaccuracies, because any statement that is not backed

¹ See appendix 6, p. 78.

up in print could be innocently misinterpreted. I don't see anything in your statement beyond the charge that there does seem to be some similarity in occasional foreign policy positions, you therefore reason that there is this link.

I just don't see any evidence here that substantiates such charge. Since I have a vague recollection that you are teaching journalism in some institution in Illinois, I am looking at page 17 of your testimony where you refer to the Chicago Sun-Times story, and you have evidently accepted the story, which was that Congressman Bonker was offered \$200 watch, an attractive woman, and so on and so forth.

I would think that between the time of that article and your appearance here, that careful journalistic research on your part would have, at least, led you to some of the disclaimers that Mr. Bonker himself made. You really should have included those in your statement, if you want to have a reputation for absolute accuracy. Something which had been substantially adjusted by subsequent statements. I say that in the sense of practicing journalism.

Actually, Mr. Chairman, we should follow through, at some appropriate point, with an NBC official. The issue is one of religious freedom, and I think that we could check that out easily.

I think that if Mr. Moon is guilty of any infraction of any of the U.S. laws, that our immigration authorities, our IRS, anybody, the FBI, the Labor Department, Justice Department, should be bringing the full effectiveness of our Government to bear against any illegal activities he may be perpetrating.

As far as I know, he is as much of an embarrassment to the Government of South Korea as he is an irritant to responsible clergymen. So I just don't think that this testimony really proves much.

I have no further questions.

Mr. LEE. Mr. Chairman, may I add a few more comments?

It seems to me very interesting that Mr. Derwinski is saying that these allegations are not substantiated. But I have to state that the statement which I made, if I were to add footnotes to it, would become a scholastic paper. It has documentation which he seems to overlook.

The second point is that the allegations which I have made here, citing newspaper reports, are nothing but allegations; therefore, they are not viable for any investigation. It seems to me that this is what Mr. Derwinski is implying.

May I ask Mr. Derwinski, when I presented my solid evidence, my material proof, why did he refuse to admit that?

Mr. DERWINSKI. If there are any questions to be asked, I will ask the questions.

You have never presented any proof to this subcommittee.

Since I don't want to take you at word value, I will go to your statement.

Mr. LEE. When I proposed to submit this letter in evidence, you refused to accept it.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Under conditions that it could be used publicly.

Mr. LEE. This can be used publicly without being made public, because this is the evidence from which the FBI or any other investigative authority of the United States can start its serious investigation.

This is a service that I am rendering, and you turn it down. You

say that my allegations are from the newspapers, and they are not worthwhile.

Mr. DERWINSKI. I would suggest, if you are so devoted to your position, that you immediately carry this letter to the FBI. I see no reason why you should be carrying such a valuable piece of evidence around with you. I think that you should go directly to the FBI, and see that they follow through.

This subcommittee is in no position to carry on an investigation. If you feel that your letter proves that our laws have been broken, turn it over to the proper authorities. A congressional committee is not an investigative arm of the Government.

Mr. LEE. If you read my statement once more, you will realize what sort of charges I made, what specific evidence, and what sort of allegations I made with the citations from the published articles.

With this in mind, I would like to make one more correction of Mr. Derwinski's previous statement. Those specific passages which he cited from the New York Times and other newspapers. Instead of citing only those negative aspects of them that any newspapers would use, the denials of any government in regard to allegations or charges, simply that is what you call balancing the news, I propose that the entire articles of these newspapers, which Mr. Derwinski cited from, should be quoted in the record, to let the readers examine the entire context. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FRASER. I think that we have agreed to have all of these different newspaper accounts made a part of the record. So there should not be any difficulty with that.

Professor, you indicated in your testimony that there was an offer by what you characterized as a KCIA front, of \$3,000 to pay some expenses of scholars to attend a conference. Could you elaborate on that incident?

Mr. LEE. Yes. There were some attendants, who after returning from Toronto, told me in person that this became an issue among some of the attendants about the refusal of such an offer. The offer was made by a KCIA frontman who came from Tokyo to attend this meeting.

I know his name, I cannot recall it offhand, but I can supply it in writing, or later. That was specifically an offer to pay the expenses of some of the scholars coming from the United States, but those would be named by the KCIA frontman who offered \$3,000 to the conference.

Mr. FRASER. Your understanding is that the money would be made available, but under an arrangement by which he could identify the people who would be bought to the conference?

Mr. LEE. Exactly. Those Park scholars, who attended the meeting, since they were going to be participants, they would have full access to manuscripts, papers, and all other material which would be presented to the conference.

If they could get their hands on them, they could find out, also, who were presenting anti-Park papers, or read them even before the conference opened. This could be done. Some seem to have done that, otherwise Prof. T. C. Rhee of California would not have been threatened by the Korean Embassy in Washington.

So there are strong indications, although Mr. Derwinski says that these are nothing but allegations. Incidentally, this was not in the newspapers; I wish to add that.

Mr. DERWINSKI. I have one question.

When you left your Embassy in 1973, did you take any documents with you?

Mr. LEE. Did I take any documents from the Embassy?

Mr. DERWINSKI. I am asking.

Mr. LEE. I wish I had, if I did, I would have the proof. I would have material, but unfortunately I did not.

Mr. DERWINSKI. That is the point that I am trying to get to. What we are hearing is your recollection of events that are at least 3 years old.

Mr. LEE. Yes. When you make statements, don't you use your own recollection? Do you simply get all the information, whatever you state, and what you say in your conversations, testimony or statements, from the Government documents. Haven't you ever done that from your recollection?

Mr. DERWINSKI. Not when I am making charges as you are. You are making charges before a congressional committee about the foreign policy conduct of an ally. You are doing so, presumably, and we are to take at face value your interpretation of your recollections—

Mr. LEE. That is very interesting. The foreign policy of the United States, how do the American people find out about it? They listen to the radio, they read the newspaper, and they watch the television, don't they? So that is how you learn.

Mr. DERWINSKI. You are making specific charges without anything to back up these charges, that is my contention.

Mr. LEE. My specific charges and evidences are presented in my statement.

Mr. FRASER. Professor Lee, I don't know that this continual exchange is serving our interest. Mr. Derwinski has indicated what his judgment is, and it is certainly one that he is entitled to place in the record.

Mr. ROLAND. May I speak to this matter for a moment?

Mr. FRASER. I wish to move away from argument.

Mr. ROLAND. This is for my own understanding. This is my first congressional meeting, and I am confused, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Go ahead.

Mr. ROLAND. What I am hearing here, these last few minutes, is something that creates a great deal of misunderstanding in my mind as to the purpose of a congressional hearing such as this.

I remember a few years ago, when before such a committee as this, some people came with some allegations. They could not be substantiated, and they came from recollection. As a result of that, we had the Watergate prosecution, which I consider to be a hallmark in American history.

So I have come here today, after 13 years, and I am hearing that this Government functions in this area by people like myself, who have spent countless thousand of hours, money that I cannot even begin to count, and somehow I am being told that the investigative agency of the United States lies in me. I don't believe that, sir.

I believe that the allegations, and they are allegations because we cannot get Park Chung Hee, or Sun Myung Moon to come here and confess, but I believe that these allegations are valid.

I suspect that if the same allegations, and the volume of material that has been published on this problem for the last few years, were made in any other area, I suspect that we would have had a full-scale investigation of every judicial enforcement agency in the U.S. Government. We would have the FBI doing the work that we are doing.

I am sorry to say, sir, I do not believe that the FBI is doing that work. I am tired, and I would like to retire. Thank you.

Mr. FRASER. The purpose of our hearings is to elicit information that is as factual as possible. What you are hearing are different responses from different members of the subcommittee as to how they interpret these statements, and that is a natural part of the congressional process. I don't think that this is a matter that has to be argued at length.

Mr. WOOD. The FBI did investigate the Unification Church in 1972, when I went to Memphis, Tenn., to try to raise money for anti-Communist work among my relatives in Memphis.

My father's cousin, Tommy Price, who is a prominent lawyer in Memphis, had the FBI investigate the Unification Church. They came up and gave them their seal of approval "Patriotic, give them as much money as you can."

Mr. LEE. Mr. Chairman, at this point, somehow, I recollect once again the name that I was trying to remember. Choe Suh Myun is the name of the KCIA frontman who came from Tokyo.

Mr. FRASER. As I understand it, and I would like to ask if any of you have information about it, there is an organization which is related to Reverend Moon's activities, to provide some kind of training. This training institution is located at or near Seoul, Korea.

My understanding is further that the South Korean Government sends its officials to take training at this school. Do any of you have any information about that?

Mr. WOOD. I visited that training center. I do not remember the name of the town, but it is outside of Seoul. We stayed in the dormitory of the training center. It was, in 1970, within the compound walls of the rifle factory, and they were building other dormitories.

Mr. FRASER. Which rifle factory?

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Moon's.

While I and several other members of the Unification Church were there, there was a training group there of about 200 people who were sore of lesser civil servants, or sort of county officials, and also a lot of people who just appeared to be peasants, and said that they were being instructed in anti-Communist ideology by members of the Unification Church.

Mr. FRASER. This was a training institute run by the Unification Church?

Mr. WOOD. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. This was being done through some organizational institution apart from the church?

Mr. WOOD. I know that it had the blessing of the South Korean Government. I know from 1967, and maybe earlier, the church leaders

told us that they had been educating civil servants, policemen, and the general populace in anti-Communist ideology, and the government was fully behind it.

This was one of the means that Mr. Moon was using to make himself indispensable to the Government, and this was something that he really emphasized, because he said :

Once we become indispensable to the government, then the government will realize it can no longer operate without us. Then we will begin to dictate policy.

Mr. FRASER. Do any of the other witnesses have any information about this training institute?

Mr. LEE. No, sir. Mr. Wood has already stated what I know. I have nothing further to say.

Mr. FRASER. Does that conform with your understanding, Professor?

Mr. LEE. Yes.

Mr. ROLAND. I am in contact with a number of sources in Japan, and a few in South Korea. Also there have been some investigative reporters for the Washington Post there. This institute is attended by any number of ranking government officials from the provincial level on up, and military officers. They are required to go there.

Mr. FRASER. You mentioned three American secretaries at the Korean Embassy who were hired at the recommendation of the Freedom Leadership Foundation at the request of KCIA. How did you learn of that, and when did this happen?

Mr. LEE. My office needed a secretary, so I placed an ad in the newspaper. In response to my classified ad, we had candidates. We interviewed them, and we hired one.

A few days later, when I bumped into one of the KCIA agents in the Embassy, in the hallway, he casually commented: "Congratulations, Dr. Lee, you have hired a new secretary." It was so casual that I did not understand what he was really saying. Simply he was having petty talk with me.

So, I said: "Yes; we have found a very nice secretary." That ended the conversation, and there was nothing strange in that. But a few days later I bumped into another KCIA agent. This time he was more specific.

He said: "Congratulations, you got a new secretary in your office." When it came the second time, besides from a different KCIA agent, I began to wonder what they were driving at. Then, perhaps, I looked puzzled, because he added:

"By any chance, does she come from the Freedom Leadership Foundation?" I had never heard of this organization before, so I was further puzzled. I asked him back: "What is the Freedom Leadership Foundation?"

He said, "I thought you knew. That is an organization with which we have very good cooperation."

I said, "What about it?"

He said, "When we need someone, we ask them to recommend someone. They send us candidates, and we hire them. In fact, there are three girls working in the Embassy now, who have been hired that way."

That was the message, which they were trying to get across to me, which I did not know, that it was the practice in the Embassy at that time.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Roland, you stated that in early 1964 Colonel Pak told you of his plans to form the Korean Cultural and Freedom Foundation. He identified the organization by that name?

Mr. ROLAND. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. How did he describe it?

Mr. ROLAND. He described it as an organization, it was very clear to me at the time because at that time we were very close. Whatever objections I had went on between my wife and I, and she never saw fit to share those objections with anyone in the movement.

So Colonel Pak did not know exactly where I stood, and he had confidence in me, subjectively. No, I was not a member of the cult, and anyone on the outside would have, except for the last few months of our association, assumed that I was friendly to their cause.

He described it very clearly that this was a front organization, and that it would be used to gain influence with wealthy people, government officials. Then he talked very clearly about using it as a fundraising organization for the Moon organization.

My main objection was, how can you do this, how can you transfer funds from a charitable foundation to a movement. All he did was to shrug his shoulders, and I got the message from that that they would find a way. I have no knowledge that they have ever transferred funds.

Mr. FRASER. You also noted in your testimony the children's dance troupe, and the name having been decided upon. Did Colonel Pak inform you of the group's name?

Mr. ROLAND. Yes, he did, and they were under training at that time under this noted dancer. He gave the name, but I cannot recall it. He said that they were going to be called the Little Angels.

My first recollection that the Little Angels had begun their entertaining around the world was, I believe, at the Constitution Hall in Washington, and I believe the year was 1967, early 1967. They entertained there. This was the first time I knew they were in the public entertainment business.

Since then, I have kept very good track of them. They have played before all the crowned heads of the world, just about.

Mr. FRASER. At the time, he specifically stated that they would be used to enhance Moon's prestige?

Mr. ROLAND. He gave an indication to me, during this discussion, that it was not primarily a fundraising organization, but rather that it would create influence for their movement, and also for the Korean Government. At that time, I had made no connection between Moon, any direct connection with the Korean Government. There was an indication that there would be a tie-in, that it would be a good cultural group, and it would make relations better between other parts of the world and South Korea.

Mr. FRASER. Was he speaking of them as helping to promote the South Korean Government? What I want to get clear, whatever recollection you have, did he refer to the Government, or did he refer to Reverend Moon?

Mr. ROLAND. He referred to the movement, and that it would serve the movement. He often talked in these veins that were not related to the Moon movement, or politics. He had a way of saying things kind of aside, this would also seem to make other people understand the South Korean people, the cultural type of movement. This it has done. It has done that.

Mr. FRASER. Did he say that the Little Angels would be associated with the KCFF at the time he talked about this?

Mr. ROLAND. No; he did not say that it would come under KCFF. This was only discovered at a later time.

Mr. FRASER. How do you know about the incident with the Seoul police officer?

Mr. ROLAND. I have a contact in South Korea, he is known to the Moon movement, and I would not hesitate to give the committee his name, except that he has done little to criticize the Park Chung Hee regime, and I think that any more publicity on this man might well cause him great difficulty in South Korea.

This man has been a long time investigator of the cult in South Korea, strictly from a religious point of view. This man is himself a scholar of religion. So he was well known in Seoul and other parts of South Korea as a man who knew much about the Moon movement, as they call it over there, the Moon party.

The record of the people who have come to him, and the information that he sent to me would boggle your mind with some of the things that have happened that are not pertinent to this hearing. This particular case was.

I will give you the man's name, I have it here somewhere. The man has disappeared. He wrote down this man's statement, Jo Dong Suk was his name, and this man had been a member of the Moon cult for 10 years, and during that time, not the entire 10 years, he had served as a liaison between the Moon group and the Blue House.

This was where Jo Dong Suk ran into Major Han at the Blue House, who was identified as the chief interpreter at the Blue House at the time. This friend of mine in Seoul tried later to get in touch with this man, and he has not been seen since.

The implication was very clear to me that it is not necessarily true that the Park Chung Hee government has done something with him, but there are many cases on record now where people are hiding not only from the Moon organization, but the Park Chung Hee government. This is my suspicion. It is my suspicion that this Jo Dong Suk is hiding for his own safety. My friend has not been able to get back in touch with him, and this was in 1974.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Wood, in an unpublished article you said that the church was acting as a political pressure group in Washington. What form did this pressure take?

Mr. Wood. In 1969, the church here in Washington and throughout its local groups in the United States carried out PR campaigns whose objectives were to diffuse the peace movement and to buttress the hawk position, and to indicate substantial grassroot support to Congressmen and Senators for a hardline stand in Asia.

This was not something that Mr. Moon had to spell out. It was just completely implicit. If you will allow me, I would like to read a short thing on this subject.

I arrived in Washington, D.C., for the second FLF Conference. Neil Salonen, who today is Moon's right-hand man in the United States, was ordered by Moon in the summer of 1969 to find the church's anti-Communist movement in the United States and to name the organization "The International Federation for the Extermination of Communism." Salonen named it FLF.

Salonen set up the Freedom Foundation as the American branch of the IFEC. On paper, FLF is listed as a nonprofit, nonpartisan educational corporation whose stated objective is to educate American youth about the dangers of communism.

From its inception, FLF was funded by the Unification Church. At this stage in the movement's development, the general membership was politically unsophisticated. The idea of a political arm was new. The purists in the movement who believed that a church should have nothing to do with politics voiced strong opposition. It was pointed out to them that the church in Japan and Korea carried out extensive anti-Communist political programs.

They were told that it was Master's expressed desire to begin political work in the United States. Thereafter, members' objection to political activities was considered infidelity to master, and was like being disobedient to God.

Mr. FRASER. I gather that "Master" refers to Reverend Moon?

Mr. WOOD. It refers to Reverend Moon. I would like to put a little addendum on that, and that is the fact that we know of this movement as a church as a result of a simple policy decision.

It could be called something else. At one time it was called the Unified Family. This is a Unification Church leaflet printed here in Washington in 1971, and I quote from this:

Since a church is the safest and most recognized form of social organization, Mr. Moon founded the church in 1954 in order to have the greatest freedom of action.

So the implication is that we will just use the name of the church, because it will be the most acceptable thing to the largest number of people.

Mr. FRASER. Was there an organization known as the American Youth for a Just Peace?

Mr. WOOD. The American Youth for Just Peace was founded by Charles Stevens and I, and we were instructed by a man named David Martin, who was Senator Dodds' foreign affairs assistant, and I believe that he today sits on the Senate Internal Security permanent staff.

We set up the American Youth for Just Peace to be a legitimate partisan political lobby organization to carry out prowar activities.

Mr. FRASER. When you say "we did * * *".

Mr. WOOD. Charles Stevens and I.

We used Unification Church members. I called up all the heads of the Unification Church in May 1970 and invited them to come to Washington and bring with them as many members as they could. We gathered about 70 or 80 people, and we lobbied for a week, going out in teams of three to all the Congressmen's and Senators' offices.

This was right in the middle of the tremendous lobbying on the other side.

Mr. FRASER. How did you become the president of the FLF? When you took that position, what were you told to do and by whom?

Mr. WOOD. I was told to carry out the day-to-day activities of the Freedom Leadership Foundation. As I understood it at that time, it meant simply to build up the organization; to make a reputation for it in Washington. To sort of ferret out the anti-Communist groups in Washington, and find out which ones we would like to associate with, and which ones we could work together with and through the Freedom Leadership Foundation to make friends with Government leaders.

Mr. FRASER. Where did the instructions come from?

Mr. WOOD. They came from Neil Salonen, from Miss Kim Young, and ultimately from Mr. Moon.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know that they came from Mr. Moon ultimately?

Mr. WOOD. I know that because in 1970, when I visited Korea, and I had several private audiences with Mr. Moon, he told me that as president of the Freedom Leadership Foundation, it was my responsibility to begin a campaign in the United States to win the power centers in the country.

At that time, he said: "FLF will probably win first the academic community." But he was not choosy. It was just intuition, he felt:

I think we will get on campuses and be successful there first. Once we can control two or three universities, then we will be on the way to controlling the reins of the certification for the major professions in the United States.

That is what we want to do because universities are the crucible in which young Americans are formed. So if we can get a hold of those, then we can move out into politics, into economics, et cetera.

Mr. FRASER. I asked you earlier about American Youth for a Just Peace. I understand they lobbied to support the Cambodian invasion. When that took place, was the Unification Church asked to help in some fashion?

Mr. WOOD. It was Unification Church members who carried out the lobbying. I was president of the Freedom Leadership Foundation, and I was cochairman of the American Youth for a Just Peace. Every staff member in that office was a member of the Unification Church, except Charles Stevens.

Mr. FRASER. Were there instructions on that particular lobbying effort coming from church authorities?

Mr. WOOD. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. From whom?

Mr. WOOD. Again, coming ultimately from Mr. Moon. Mr. Osami Kobaki, the president of the Japanese church, visited the United States in the summer of 1970, and Moon had been here in 1965 and 1969, and Miss Kim was in touch with him.

His basic format for lobbying, as I heard it by hearsay, and later from him directly, was:

What you do is you go to a Senator's office, or a Congressman's office, and you tell him that you live in his State. You live in his district. You are eager to help, and you want to know what the problems are, and how can you be responsive and a responsible citizen.

Then he has your name, and he runs into trouble. He needs some help, and he calls you up. You work for him. Later you go back and you get some flowers,

and you get him a gift of flowers. You go back and you bring two beautiful girls with you. They give him flowers.

When it comes time for reelection, you take 10 or 15 people to work just doing the hardcore canvassing, or whatever it takes. If he runs into trouble, you try to bail him out.

Mr. FRASER. How was the FLF, the Freedom Leadership Foundation, funded?

Mr. WOOD. By the Unification Church. In 1969, when FLF was founded, the Unification Church did not really have a collective pocketbook. People had private income, private checkbooks. I think that after 1972, everything was collectivized, but in 1969 when FLF was founded, Miss Kim, or Salonen would make a talk to the assembled Washington Unification Church and say: "We need \$500, or we need \$1,000," then people would make individual contributions. Those people were all members of the Unification Church.

After 1972, I don't think that FLF—it may have gotten money from selling the *Rising Time*, which is its political organ, which is distributed here in Congress and around the country, but I believe that they probably broke even with the printing costs. I think that still the money came from the Unification Church, and I think that it still does.

I am not sure, that is just the thing.

Mr. FRASER. Was your wife working at that time?

Mr. WOOD. Yes, my wife was the director of the Columbia Heights Day Care Center, and she was a member of the Unification Church. She earned about \$12,000 a year, and every cent of her income went into the Unification Church. I know that at times her monthly paycheck would go to FLF.

I don't know if they had a bank account then, but they must have started one at some time. Initially, it was just straight church funds.

Mr. FRASER. Were the moneys held in the form of cash?

Mr. WOOD. I could not say.

Mr. FRASER. When you went to Vietnam and Cambodia for American Youth for a Just Peace, who paid for the trip?

Mr. WOOD. I was told that our trip was paid by the South Vietnamese Ministry of the Interior. It was a round trip ticket.

Mr. FRASER. What was the purpose of that tour?

Mr. WOOD. The ostensible purpose of the tour was a factfinding mission to reveal what was really going on in Asia. The factfinding tour was acceptable to the South Vietnamese Government because they had the tacit understanding with us that we would find good findings there, favorable to the position of the Thieu Government, favorable to the position of the American military, favorable to continued military presence.

Mr. FRASER. To your knowledge, did Reverend Moon or any of his top aides have any role in the tour?

Mr. WOOD. Not directly. After we went to Vietnam and Cambodia, we went directly to Japan and participated in the World Anti-Communist League Conference. Then we went on to visit Mr. Moon in Korea.

Mr. FRASER. You said in your testimony that there was talk of some danger that Moon might be assassinated by the Park government.

From that point on, was there a change in the activities, an increase, for example, of pro-Korean activities?

Mr. WOOD. I know that FLF has always been concerned with promoting the image of South Korea as over against North Korea. I know FLF is—the FLF ideology, the political vision is absolutely one with Mr. Moon's theological vision. There is absolutely no difference.

So the Freedom Leadership Foundation sees Korea as the third "Israel," and they think that North and South Korea must be united under Mr. Moon, or else there will be a third world war.

So FLF from its beginning has promoted the South Korean Government.

Mr. FRASER. I may have covered this, but just to be sure, did Moon ever say anything to you about what he wanted in the way of a relationship with the South Korean Government?

Mr. WOOD. He wanted President Park to become absolutely dependent on him.

Mr. FRASER. Was this on the basis of a conversation you had firsthand?

Mr. WOOD. It was based on firsthand conversation, and also Mr. Moon speaking to us directly at an assembly of members.

Mr. FRASER. What do you know of Moon's "God Loves Nixon" campaign?

Mr. WOOD. In the early fall of 1973, Mr. Nixon was running into trouble, there was a man named Kennedy in Atlanta, I believe he was a doctor. Kennedy, somehow, knew Neil Salonen, and was friends with him, and suggested to him that the Unification Church take up the banner of Mr. Nixon and defend him and urge that the American populace be clement and forgiving.

Salonen approached Moon and suggested this plan as a public relations ploy to get in close with the Government and with the power structure. Moon did not like the idea. Moon was in the middle of his speaking tour through 21 cities, and he had to go back to Japan for a conference of—this is a science conference that Moon holds. He has held four of them. This is the conference on the unification of sciences.

He went back to Japan and Korea for 2 weeks, and then he returned to the United States. When he came back, he said God had told him while he was in deep meditation in Korea, "forgive," "love," and "unite."

Then the full-page ads appeared, and Mr. Moon issued the order that all Unification Church members in America should send telegrams of support to President Nixon, and that was carried out.

Mr. FRASER. Did Moon ever tell you that he wanted to be as useful as possible to Korea?

Mr. WOOD. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Can you give us your own version of what you remember him saying?

Mr. WOOD. It will not be a direct quote, it will be kind of a composite.

Mr. FRASER. Your best recollection.

Mr. WOOD. He would talk about the way we would work in South Korea, the way we would gain the allegiance of the South Korean Government, and that was a model for winning control of other coun-

tries, the United States included. Very simply, it is the same plan as that for winning a Congressman or a Senator.

You make yourself available to serve, and you serve that man with whatever it is. You carry out his orders. You carry out his directives until he trusts you absolutely, whether it is political work, economic work, or social work. Then finally when your services have become indispensable, then you begin to dictate policy. If he deviates from the policy you have set, you withdraw your support, and he is powerless. So he has no choice but to follow you.

Basically, it is "I am going to serve you to death," approach.

Mr. FRASER. I have covered, not all, but most of the questions that I wanted to ask the panel. Before we close the hearing, I would like to ask each of you if there is any sort of last comment that they would like to make in light of the questions and answers that have gone on, or some other matter that may have occurred to them during this discussion.

Mr. ROLAND. I would like to start, Mr. Chairman.

As I said earlier, 13 years is a long time, so last year—I remarried 3 years ago—I said to my wife, I am tired, but I have an obligation. I want to drop this whole thing because other parents have picked up the banner, so to speak.

So I want to drop this, but before I do I want to tell somebody. So I compiled a report, 14 pages in length, of which I sent a copy last July. I went to the FBI, and I said to Agent Powers:

Before I talk with you and give you this report, I would like to have you check me out, because you are going to think that I am nuts.

It was true then, and before that it was more so, but today it is becoming more of a reality to people. I knew of the dangers from long discussions with Colonel Pak on this issue. I knew of the danger that Moon represented to American involvement in another Vietnam.

He made quite clear to me over a period of almost 2 years that the entire Korean peninsula was indispensable to their success. Moon has to rule that peninsula, it was his new "Israel," from his religious ideology, and he must rule that nation first. Until he does, he cannot go on to rule any other nation.

So I gave this report to the FBI. He called me 5 days later, and he said:

I can tell you this, it has gone on to Washington. This about all I can tell you.

I really think, and I really believe because Moon by his own statements, which are available. We have his training manuals, and his speeches, which I have dating back to 1965. You don't have any trouble determining what he is saying in his speeches.

He has told some of his followers in some of these manuals and speeches that 1981 is the deadline. The study of Moon's life is fascinating. The only question that is left to me is, because he said very clearly, if we do not achieve this goal of ruling the Korean peninsula by 1981, we shall have to wait 21 more years, or three 7-year periods. Moon does a great deal with numerology.

The only question left to me is, knowing the man as I think I know him through a very long study, will this man who at the turn of the century will be 80 years old be willing to wait until the year 2002. I am not sure.

I knew that last year, and the year before last, when this issue was coming before the United Nations on the withdrawal of American troops under U.S. auspices in North and South Korea, and it frightened me.

I knew that something had to be done, because I personally knew last September, when this issue came before the United Nations, that third world powers might succeed in pressuring this country to withdraw its forces from South Korea. I have no doubt in my own mind as to what might happen if we should make such a move and announce such a move. I am just waiting for that question to be answered. We may not have time, and there are 42,000 troops to separate the North Korean from the South Korean Army, and I do not want another South Vietnam.

I think that this administration, and this Congress, with the exception of you, sir, I think that in my opinion you are the only man who has taken real interest in what is going on. I think that unless we act, it may be too late.

Mr. FRASER. You have talked in ways that are not clear. If the United States were to pull out, what do you think would happen?

Mr. ROLAND. I think that both Park Chung Hee and Mr. Moon realize that there is no possibility at this point in time of winning a war with North Korea without our support. Any attempt to pull out American forces from South Korea, I am not sure of what might happen.

Now, somebody has to move. Park Chung Hee is saying, that is with his multibillion-dollar military aid that we are going to give him over the next few years, he will be self-sufficient, and we can pull out troops at this point in time. At this time, I do not think that they can stage a war against the North successfully.

Mr. FRASER. The pulling out might evoke some response from the South Korean Government?

Mr. ROLAND. Yes, sir, I don't think that it would be very difficult at all for Park Chung Hee, consorting with whomever he might be consorting, to provoke an incident. I think that the American public at this time could be fooled very easily.

It is interesting to note that in November 1974, when President Ford went there, and it has been spoken of, there was a great deal of outcry in this country for his not going, under the circumstances. In June, a tunnel was found under the DMZ by two South Korean soldiers. Park Chung Hee was very smart. He kept that information until just the time when President Ford arrived there on November 22, 1974. Then he announced it, and it had the desired effect.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Lee.

Mr. LEE. Yes, Mr. Chairman, since it is getting late, I will make a short comment, which I have already stated in my recommendations.

All these illegal activities of the KCIA agents and the Park official within the United States must be stopped by all means. To do so, we have to consider the policy of the United States toward the Park regime.

As long as the attitude of this administration is such as it is, there is no way we can possibly convince the dictator in Korea to stop his harassment and threats and intimidations, extortions, and all these

things within the territory of the United States. I wish to stress that point.

Fortunately, Secretary Kissinger spoke out for human rights while he was in Chile. I hope that he seriously meant that.

I wish to state also that a few days ago Rev. Pak Hyung Kyu, who had been arrested and imprisoned before by the Park government because of his activities for restoration of democratic institutions and human rights in Korea, was arrested again. This time he seems to be either arrested or taken away, and no public announcement has yet been made by the Korean Government. But simply, he disappeared. I have that communication here with me.

These things I have testified are all going on today in the United States, and repression of human rights and continual destruction of democratic institutions are going on in South Korea. Therefore, I urge the State Department and the Secretary of State in particular, to see to it that this policy which he spoke of in Chile should equally apply to South Korea. Thank you.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Professor Lee.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Moon enjoys the freedom which this country affords him, but if through accident or just through everyone staying asleep he got into the position that Adolf Hitler got into around 1933, American democracy would dissolve overnight. It would just be a memory very quickly because Mr. Moon believes in divine kingship, and not in dialog, or anything that is part of American tradition.

Mr. FRASER. I thank all three of you witnesses. I apologize for the length of time you have been here, the delay caused by voting has contributed to that. You have been very helpful to the subcommittee. Thank you very much.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 6 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

ACTIVITIES OF THE KOREAN CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN THE UNITED STATES

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1976

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2:10 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office building, Hon. Donald M. Fraser (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. FRASER. The subcommittee will come to order.

The Subcommittee on International Organizations convenes today to receive further testimony related to allegations of improper or illegal activity by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in the United States.

Our inquiry into this matter began in response to numerous reports that efforts to silence opposition to the government of Park Chung Hee have been extended to the United States, directed by officials of the Korean CIA against U.S. citizens and Korean nationals living here. The purpose of the inquiry is to examine these allegations and report any findings of apparent illegality or serious impropriety to agencies of the executive branch for appropriate action.

In previous hearings, we have received sworn testimony indicating links between the KCIA and persons or organizations affiliated with the Reverend Sun Myung Moon. The testimony alleged:

That KCIA agents have maintained contact with the Freedom Leadership Foundation and that at least three American secretaries were hired by the Korean Embassy upon recommendations of the Freedom Leadership Foundation which furnished candidates at the request of the KCIA;

That a close associate of Rev. Moon has had access to secret communications facilities at the Korean Embassy;

That American members of the Unification Church are taught to regard Korea as the "fatherland" and to lobby in the U.S. Congress on behalf of positions of the South Korean Government;

That a close associate of Rev. Sun Myung Moon has a background of Korean intelligence work; and

That Radio Free Asia, a project run by a close associate of Rev. Sun Myung Moon, was controlled by the South Korean Government.

In other sworn testimony, the subcommittee was told that in September 1974 the KCIA planned to organize anti-Japanese demonstrations in the United States and that the State Department, upon learning of the plans, insisted that there be no demonstrations, citing legal penalties against harassment of official visitors.

The Prime Minister of Japan was scheduled to visit the United States at that time. Relations between Japan and South Korea had become tense as a result of the kidnaping of Kim Dae Jung by the KCIA from a Tokyo hotel in 1973 and the assassination of President Park's wife by a Korean resident of Japan in 1974.

For several weeks after the assassination there were anti-Japanese demonstrations in Seoul, including ransacking of offices in the Japanese Embassy. On September 5 the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea presented President Park with a letter from President Ford expressing deep concern over the deterioration of relations between these two Asian allies of the United States.

After President Ford announced plans to visit Japan without stopping in Korea, South Korea strongly desired that he add Seoul to his itinerary. This was the setting in which anti-Japanese demonstrations reportedly were contemplated in the United States during the same period, August and September of 1974.

Our witness today is Chris Elkins, a former member of the Freedom Leadership Foundation. A subpoena was served on Mr. Elkins on September 14 requiring his appearance before the subcommittee.

This Thursday, September 30, the subcommittee will conduct another hearing on the activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency. Pending approval by vote of the subcommittee, the hearing will be held in executive session.

The witness will be Neil A. Salonen, president of the Freedom Leadership Foundation.

Mr. Elkins, we are glad to have you here. What I would like to do is to have you sworn in. Then I think we will recess briefly so that we can vote. There is a vote pending on the floor of the House.

Please raise your right hand.

In the testimony you are about to give, do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. ELKINS. Yes; I do.

Mr. FRASER. We will take a short recess in view of the vote on the floor.

[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.]

Mr. FRASER. The subcommittee will resume its hearing.

Mr. Elkins, you have a prepared statement. Why don't you proceed.

STATEMENT OF CHRIS ELKINS, FORMER MEMBER, FREEDOM LEADERSHIP FOUNDATION

Mr. ELKINS. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the privilege of being able to appear here this afternoon and offer testimony concerning my activity with groups founded by Sun Myung Moon. My activity with these groups has been quite broad and extensive and I hope to be able to give you a brief synopsis in this opening statement of some experiences that may be of concern to you. I am here independently—that is, I am not in cooperation with any citizens committee or religious committee organized against Moon.

I first joined with the Moon organization on June 23, 1973, in Tucson, Ariz. I was a senior economics major, president of my fraternity, and quite active in student life. Somewhat disenchanted with career prospects and also somewhat idealistic I was prime for such a

movement as the "One World Crusade," a Moon organization, which I joined after attending a series of lectures. I was fascinated with the organization, their outlook, and the fraternal concern amongst the members. Their standards were high and I was impressed.

My tenure in Arizona was short. In mid-September of 1973 I was recruited for the New Hope Singers International, another Moon group, being formed in Tarrytown, N.Y., to aid Moon in his "whirlwind" tours of the United States. I remained in the choir until February 1975 at which time Neil Salonen, president of the Unification Church of America and president of the Freedom Leadership Foundation, again both Moon organizations, recruited me for FLF here in Washington, D.C.

From February 1974 to August 1975 I remained in Washington with various Moon organizations, that is, the Ginseng Teahouse, Collegiate Association for the Research of Principles (CARP) and the local Unification Church. I often worked closely with Neil Salonen and on occasion with Pak Bo Hi, Moon's interpreter and special assistant.

From August 1975 to January 1976 I was in New York City with Columbia University CARP as editor of their monthly paper, the World Student Times. I left this maze of organizations and my affiliation with Moon on January 4, 1976, at my own will. I have since been living on my own and am back in school. I do not wish to disclose my whereabouts.

May I take this opportunity to point out that the members of these various organizations are all in essence members of the Unification Church and act in behalf of Moon in various roles and situations. No one, to my knowledge, draws a salary and all except the leaders in the highest leadership positions or the movement fund raise in order to meet all personal and organizational expenses. They all believe that Moon is the Messiah and revere his word as God's. A good portion of them would give their very lives for him. I am not aware of any overt brainwashing activities and I have been quite involved in their recruitment procedure. Emotion control is more the term.

Some activities that I am aware of concern some areas that this committee is involved. I feel that the disclosure of what I know may be of aid to you in discovering the nature of these organizations and the nature of their activities and scope.

Freedom Leadership Foundation (FLF), a nonprofit, tax-exempt, educational organization has been engaged in activities, to my knowledge, that are beyond the restriction of its incorporation. It has on occasion sent mailings to the Members of Congress urging support for certain legislation, especially legislation concerning military support for Southeast Asia and Korea in particular. I have participated in this activity but can offer no specifics as to certain dates that this might have occurred. As the need would arise FLF would sometimes be briefed on the situations concerning them from congressional and Pentagon contacts.

FLF actively participated in the election contest between Charles Stephens and Richard Ottinger in October 1974 on behalf of Stephens. There is no doubt in my mind that Stephens was fully aware of who we were and who our organization represented. At one time or another

the whole FLF staff participated in the campaign with no more than 10 being there at once. I had never met Stephens until I was sent to work on his campaign.

During this same period members of the New Hampshire Unification Church were actively campaigning in Louis Wyman's bid for the junior Senate seat from New Hampshire. In return for campaign assistance it was my knowledge that Wyman offered a staff position in his office if he was elected. This was relayed to me through Dan Fefferman, secretary general of FLF, after his contact with Michael Smith, then the director of the New Hampshire Unification Church. I was to fill that position once it became available. Wyman eventually lost the bid for the seat and thus I never was on his staff.

In early September of 1974 I was involved in one of the most unusual activities of my tenure with the church. Via direct instruction from Neil Salonen four others and myself were to be involved in an "egging" of the Japanese Embassy. I am sure that you will question me further concerning this matter so I will say nothing more at this time than it was a planned harassment activity undertaken by the church and planned by Salonen.

In closing this opening statement let me say that I was by no means a good and loyal member of the church by their absolute standards. I had doubts and disagreement throughout the 2 years that I was involved. I was only valuable to the church because of my abilities and usual willingness to follow directions. I feel sure that the church will try to discredit my testimony perhaps by slandering me. I can only say that I have tried to relay to you only those things that I directly experienced or knew from sources to be true. I do not hold a grudge against the church or any of its members. I do feel that there is a dangerous potential amongst this group and encourage the committee to investigate it to your satisfaction.

I am ready to answer any questions that you might now have.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you very much, Mr. Elkins.

You indicated that you joined the Unification Church in 1973, in June, while you were living in Tucson, Ariz.?

Mr. ELKINS. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. And that at various times you either worked in New York City or in Washington, D.C., or you were on tour with the choir as part of the Moon organization?

Mr. ELKINS. That is right.

Mr. FRASER. I would like to turn your attention to the last incident which you described in your testimony which was, as you have said in your statement, a project involving the "egging" of the Japanese Embassy. When was that incident planned to take place?

Mr. ELKINS. I can't remember exactly the date but by going back and picking certain dates I can remember I have narrowed it down to the first week in September, it was a weekday and beyond that I cannot say specifically. I know it was before September 18 and it was after Park Chung Hee's wife was assassinated in Korea which was in mid-August that year.

Mr. FRASER. We are talking about August and September of 1974?

Mr. ELKINS. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Where were you staying at that time?

Mr. ELKINS. At that time I was working with the staff of the Ginseng Teahouse. We were living at 1365 Connecticut Avenue, which is a church building.

Mr. FRASER. Who was your immediate superior at that time?

Mr. ELKINS. My immediate superior was Marx Lee.

Mr. FRASER. What was his position?

Mr. ELKINS. He was manager of the Ginseng Teahouse at that time. I was working as his assistant. We worked with a staff of about 10.

Mr. FRASER. Were you involved or were you to have been involved in this incident involving the Japanese Embassy?

Mr. ELKINS. Yes; I was.

Mr. FRASER. When did you first have some knowledge about the incident?

Mr. ELKINS. I had heard about 24 hours beforehand what was going to take place through the grapevine. At that point I did not know I was involved. On the morning it was to occur, very early on the morning it was to occur, Neil Salonen approached me about it and told me what was going to take place and my involvement in it. Basically four others and I were going to in essence egg the Japanese Embassy and hopefully—it was being planned around noon and perhaps to catch the Japanese Ambassador.

Mr. FRASER. Where did this meeting take place?

Mr. ELKINS. This took place at 1365 Connecticut Avenue, Mr. Salonen's offices at that time were there.

Mr. FRASER. This attack on the Japanese Embassy was to include yourself and four others?

Mr. ELKINS. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Was it to include Mr. Salonen?

Mr. ELKINS. No, Mr. Salonen would not have been directly involved.

Mr. FRASER. He discussed the plans at that time?

Mr. ELKINS. At that time he gave me a brief sketch of what we were going to do as far as there was going to be a car in a certain area and we were going to throw eggs. As you mentioned earlier in the statement, there was a lot of tension between Japan and Korea at this time and we were hopefully going to point out our concern over the situation, you know, U.S. concern over it. So Neil Salonen pointed out to me why basically we were doing it. It was very simple, egging and running.

Mr. FRASER. You and the four others were to proceed to the vicinity of the Japanese Embassy?

Mr. ELKINS. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Having arrived there you were going to throw eggs at it?

Mr. ELKINS. A signal was going to be given to us when was the right time.

Mr. FRASER. Then you were going to leave promptly?

Mr. ELKINS. Yes, very promptly. We had no desire that this would be connected with the Unification Church.

Mr. FRASER. With respect to the people who were asked to take part in this was there any effort to be selective in who took part, in terms of their appearance?

Mr. ELKINS. We were only, as far as this situation is concerned, together just once. To my recollection, those who were involved were basically dependable and fairly much in leadership positions, not as much so as was Neil Salonen, but different organizations within the church were represented.

Mr. FRASER. Was there another activity that was planned to take place at the same time?

Mr. ELKINS. There was a rally taking place at this point at Dupont Circle. That was going to proceed from Dupont Circle to Lafayette Square in front of the White House which would more or less serve as a diversionary tactic, to keep the police tied up with that. They were going to make a lot of noise and with lots of banners, such as that. This was to be diversion for the police in the area so that there would not perhaps be as much coverage.

Mr. FRASER. The demonstration at Dupont Circle was being sponsored by whom?

Mr. ELKINS. The Unification Church.

Mr. FRASER. So there were two things planned to take place at the same time?

Mr. ELKINS. Right.

Mr. FRASER. One, the demonstration at Dupont Circle.

Mr. ELKINS. Right.

Mr. FRASER. Which was then to move down toward the White House.

Mr. ELKINS. Yes. It would have proceeded to the White House.

Mr. FRASER. You described that as a diversionary tactic?

Mr. ELKINS. Yes. I think if any connection would have been made, if the incident would have been consummated, if any connection would have been made I feel like, you know, most would think that our involvement would have been in the demonstration and would not have connected us because we were involved with something else.

Mr. FRASER. Did Mr. Salonen indicate to you what the purpose was of this attack on the Japanese Embassy?

Mr. ELKINS. I think at this time there was tension between Japan and Korea. Mrs. Park had been killed. There was quite a bit of tension between the two countries. They were threatening to recognize North Korea at this time. This would have been a major blow to South Korea and their stand in the world. So, in order that the situation be averted and a strong show of American support for South Korea, it was felt that the Japanese would not go against a strong American show of support. This was, you know, only to be the beginning, a message to the effect that, you know, this was only a foretaste of what would happen when Tanaka visited a few weeks later.

Mr. FRASER. The Prime Minister of Japan was scheduled to arrive in the United States a few weeks after this incident?

Mr. ELKINS. In September, that is right. It was leaving a message that there was a possibility of more trouble until the situation had been alleviated.

Mr. FRASER. Who directed the planning for this?

Mr. ELKINS. It was Mr. Salonen, Neil Salonen from the word "go." He went through the whole motions with us.

Mr. FRASER. Did in fact the demonstration take place in Dupont Circle?

Mr. ELKINS. The demonstration began in Dupont Circle. There was singing and chanting; the posters were made; it definitely had begun.

Mr. FRASER. What was the theme of that demonstration?

Mr. ELKINS. Since I was not directly involved in it I cannot remember exactly but to my knowledge it was on the same general theme, support for South Korea. Of course, that whole Southeast Asia situation was still in a turmoil at that time.

Mr. FRASER. Did the attack on the Japanese Embassy actually take place?

Mr. ELKINS. No, it did not.

Mr. FRASER. What happened?

Mr. ELKINS. Well, the eggs were bought. A group of us were together, we were ready to go. Neil Salonen was going to make one more call to Moon to make sure everything was OK. He went upstairs to his office and reappeared in about 15 minutes and told us that the whole thing had been called off because Ford had agreed to make a stop in Seoul, Korea, on his way to Vladivostok, in which case that would show more than enough American support for South Korea and egging would not be necessary.

Mr. FRASER. Did Mr. Salonen tell you to whom he spoke?

Mr. ELKINS. From what he told us he said that he did speak to Moon and he found these things out when he spoke with him.

Mr. FRASER. Was this an unusual action to have been planned; that is, an attack on the Japanese Embassy, or had you and others in whatever capacity been engaged in these kinds of incidents in the past?

Mr. ELKINS. I had never been engaged in this kind of incident in the past at all. In my history with the church I had never been directly involved in something like this before. That does not mean that it never happened. I don't know anything else of this nature.

Mr. FRASER. As far as you were concerned it was unusual?

Mr. ELKINS. Yes. As far as I was concerned it was unusual.

Mr. FRASER. The reasons that you were given for being asked to take part in this was that it had to do with Korean-Japanese relations; is that right?

Mr. ELKINS. Yes. So much of Moon's activities in this country are to influence the South Korean Government that he is making a big splash in America. I would feel reasonably sure that had such an event taken place, I doubt if the Unification Church would have publicly taken credit for it, but if it had ever reached Park it would have been known who was behind it all.

Mr. FRASER. In selecting the people to take part in the planned attack was an effort made to pick people who would appear to be Americans rather than of Japanese or Korean background?

Mr. ELKINS. Exactly. It had to appear as a purely American tactic. There were purposely no orientals involved. In fact, even in the demonstration that was going from—like I said, I wasn't involved in the demonstration but more often than not in Washington in anything based with the church the orientals were not here. They were more often in New York. Washington being the Capital, it had to be an American effort.

Mr. FRASER. With respect to the plan of attack was it on the Embassy or was it on the Ambassador?

Mr. ELKINS. It would have been primed to have gotten the Ambassador of course. We would have settled for strictly egging the Embassy. It was planned around lunch and the Ambassador was known to go in and out at lunch. It was best that it happened then.

Mr. FRASER. Turning to the position that you had at that time which you told us was assistant manager of the Ginseng Teahouse in Washington, D.C.—

Mr. ELKINS. Yes.

Mr. FRASER [continuing]. Were you paid for that job?

Mr. ELKINS. No. To my knowledge, I don't know anyone who is paid in the church. I received no pay at all.

Mr. FRASER. You told us you were working for the Ginseng Co.?

Mr. ELKINS. The Ginseng Teahouse. It is basically, the official title was the Ginseng—I am sorry, it just left me—it was doing business as Ginseng Teahouse. It was the Ginseng Trading Corp. They were doing business as the Ginseng Teahouse. The Ginseng Trading Corp. imports Ginseng tea from Korea which is processed by the Moon factories.

Mr. FRASER. Does Rev. Moon own the factories in South Korea that supply the tea to the teahouse?

Mr. ELKINS. In strictly organizational and legal terms I don't think he owns, he is the chairman of the board or president of the company in all of these cases, but the title is held by the church, to my knowledge, in such business organizations.

Mr. FRASER. So when you worked for the Ginseng Teahouse as an assistant manager here in Washington you were not paid and you regarded it as an extension of the church activity?

Mr. ELKINS. Yes. It was an assignment. As is most everyone's position in the church you are assigned by either Mr. Salonen or some portion of the movement or some responsible person in the movement, assigned to a certain area and I was assigned to work in the Ginseng Teahouse.

Mr. FRASER. Prior to working for the Ginseng Teahouse what was your position?

Mr. ELKINS. Prior to the teahouse I worked with the Freedom Leadership Foundation.

Mr. FRASER. You referred to the Freedom Leadership Foundation in your statement as a nonprofit tax-exempt educational organization.

Mr. ELKINS. Right.

Mr. FRASER. When you worked for them, were you paid?

Mr. ELKINS. No; I was not.

Mr. FRASER. At another time you worked for the Unification Church, itself?

Mr. ELKINS. Right, the local church here in Washington.

Mr. FRASER. As you moved from one organization to the other, was there any change in your pay status?

Mr. ELKINS. No.

Mr. FRASER. In other words, you weren't paid when you worked at any of them?

Mr. ELKINS. I was not paid when I worked at any of them, right.

Mr. FRASER. How did you take care of your living expenses?

Mr. ELKINS. All of the expenses of the church are taken care of on a communal basis. The members of—let us say—the local Unification

Church here will fund raise, going out and selling flowers and candy, such as that, in order to meet personal expenses as well as functional and organizational expenses. Any time I needed any clothes, or anything, I went to whoever was my immediate superior and said, "I need some new clothes, I needed this or that." We either received the money or what we needed directly.

Mr. FRASER. That arrangement did not change as you moved from one position to the next?

Mr. ELKINS. On occasion I did receive somewhat of an allowance but it was never on a regular basis. I did have maybe some money to carry around in my pocket at certain times because sometimes the position I would be in I would have to have at least some money on me, though in the usual case a church member would not have a great deal of money, if any at all, on him.

Mr. FRASER. Now, you referred to the fact that you were assigned to work in a political campaign. When did that take place?

Mr. ELKINS. This was in October of 1974. Moon had a rally here on October 16, I think it was, at the D.A.R. Constitution Hall. After that I was sent up to New York to participate in campaigns.

Mr. FRASER. Who gave you the instructions to go to New York?

Mr. ELKINS. Neil Salonen.

Mr. FRASER. Neil Salonen?

Mr. ELKINS. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Did he give them to you directly?

Mr. ELKINS. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. In substance, what did he say to you?

Mr. ELKINS. Well, this was right after the campaign. When I say campaign I mean church campaign as far as Moon's speech. Certain members of the Freedom Leadership Foundation had already gone up to work on Charlie Stephens' campaign. So, after the campaign here he—at that time there were organizational procedures and such going on here in Washington—so he sent me to New York to work, it must have been the 17th or 18th of October. He just came to me and requested that I go up.

Mr. FRASER. He requested you to go to New York. Did he explain why you would be going to New York?

Mr. ELKINS. I knew the name Charlie Stephens. I knew he had been working with the FLF and I had heard we were working in his campaign. Mr. Salonen also realized I had been active in politics before, before my association with the church and, I suppose, figured I would enjoy it. He did not offer any substantial reasoning as to why I should go but that I was needed there.

Mr. FRASER. He made the request and he told you it was to campaign for Mr. Stephens?

Mr. ELKINS. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Had you met Mr. Stephens before that?

Mr. ELKINS. No; I never had.

Mr. FRASER. In what capacity was Mr. Salonen giving you the direction to go to New York?

Mr. ELKINS. He was president of the Freedom Leadership Foundation and also president of the Unification Church and in essence he is in a position to send any American member to whatever position he sees fit.

Mr. FRASER. Did you regard this as an order to go up?

Mr. ELKINS. As much as I regarded anything else, any other request or assignment as an order. I did not refuse it or argue about it, you know, he did not force me to go against my will, but as I said in my statement, I was usually willing to follow directions. And this is a good quality to have or quality to attain in the movement.

Mr. FRASER. So this was an assignment?

Mr. ELKINS. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. You did go to New York?

Mr. ELKINS. Yes; I did.

Mr. FRASER. Did you engage in the campaign there?

Mr. ELKINS. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Were you paid by the campaign itself?

Mr. ELKINS. No, we stayed on church property, the church facilities, in Tarrytown, N.Y. I never received, maybe a meal or something like that working with Charlie Stephens, but I was not paid by Stephens to work with the campaign.

Mr. FRASER. So basically the support for your taking care of your need for housing and food and so on remained the same as when you were in Washington, D.C.?

Mr. ELKINS. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. You have indicated in your statement that other of your associates were in New York at the same time.

Mr. ELKINS. Right. I think there was always at least one of two representatives of the FLF back here in Washington to hold down the office but at one time or another all of us participated in the campaign.

Mr. FRASER. You referred also to another campaign, a campaign for the Senate in New Hampshire. You were not directly involved in that; is that right?

Mr. ELKINS. That is right. Only the New Hampshire Unification Church members were involved as far as the campaign was concerned.

Mr. FRASER. People were not sent up from Washington or New York to campaign in that?

Mr. ELKINS. Not that I know of.

Mr. FRASER. But you became involved because out of an arrangement: there was some undertaking to provide a staff position to a member of the Church. Was that it?

Mr. ELKINS. Yes. The way I discovered, at least my involvement in it, I was speaking with Dan Fefferman one evening and he brought up the subject that we had been working with Louis Wyman in New Hampshire, that we had been in direct contact, in fact, almost continual contact to my knowledge with Michael Smith who was director of the Unification Church in New Hampshire. Members of the church had worked in his campaign and in return, and I think it was known before the election the election was going to be very close—I don't think they knew it was going to be as close as it did turn out—but for any and all support he was being very appreciative. I understand that the Unification Church there gave quite a lot of time and effort as far as his campaign was concerned and he said he would give a position on his staff to a member of the church because of their participation.

As I understand it, there were no qualified people in New Hampshire to do this. Because I had been involved in politics outside the church before I joined, it was requested by Dan Fefferman that I fill that

position and Neil Salonen did approve it. I had seen several sessions in Congress when they were debating over who won the election because it was so close and I did on occasion meet Louie Wyman, though I doubt he remembers me, he had so much on his mind and so many people around him at the time. But from Dan Fefferman I found out about my involvement. I had no doubt in my mind that that was the actual fact of what was going on.

Mr. FRASER. I would like to turn now to that part of the statement in which you refer to mailings to Members of Congress urging support for measures, particularly legislation concerning military support for Southeast Asia and Korea. Could you tell us more about that activity?

Mr. ELKINS. Particularly right after I went to FLF, which was in February of 1974, of course the support for our efforts in Vietnam was very shaky then, so any time there was an appropriation concerning Southeast Asia it was very doubtful it was going to go through, and many of these package deals involved Korea and so we were particularly interested in the solvency of South Korea, to make sure it remained so.

Often we knew people who were working on the Hill and in the Pentagon, such as that, and we knew more or less what was going on so far as the military appropriation, what the likelihood was of its being passed, the nature of changes that were going to be made. You know, we took a particular interest in it. It was not beyond our effort to send out mailings to every Member of the Congress. I have sat up, myself, at night at these automatic typewriting machines all night making these letters so that we could send them out in time. Of course, stuff did not go out on FLF stationery. They knew there was a restriction on there as far as their incorporation was concerned.

Mr. FRASER. Let me ask you about this. You say that you, yourself sat up at night working on the automatic typewriters typing letters?

Mr. ELKINS. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. These would be directed to Members of Congress?

Mr. ELKINS. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. The subject matter was what?

Mr. ELKINS. Was concerning military aid.

Mr. FRASER. Military aid to—

Mr. ELKINS. South Korea, particularly Southeast Asia, particularly if there was a bill up.

Mr. FRASER. Where were these typewriters located?

Mr. ELKINS. 2025 "I" Street which were FLF headquarters at that time.

Mr. FRASER. That was the Freedom Leadership Foundation headquarters?

Mr. ELKINS. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. When you typed these letters whose name went on the bottom?

Mr. ELKINS. In nearly all correspondence that we had that went out, Dan Fefferman signed most everything that I can remember. As I said in my statement, so much happened while I was involved in FLF, I can't remember a specific incident, a letter that I sat down and sent out was signed by Dan Fefferman. I can't say that and be absolutely truthful about it. In most cases Dan Fefferman did sign the correspondence that went out.

Mr. FRASER. He is the operating officer of the FLF?

Mr. ELKINS. Yes, his title is secretary general.

Mr. FRASER. That letter, although typed in the headquarters and sent by him did not go out on the FLF letterhead?

Mr. ELKINS. No. Quite often FLF would join with other groups. They were in close association with anything that varied from the YAF to the Young Socialists. You know, it depended on what we needed as to who our association was with at that time. We would be in cooperation with them in sending out letters or Vietnamese interest groups, anti-Communist groups. We were in pretty close association with those who could lobby.

Mr. FRASER. During your service of 2½ years you were involved with the FLF or the Ginseng Teahouse or the church did you become aware of an effort to have members make particularly close contact on the Hill here?

Mr. ELKINS. There is a committee that I haven't mentioned. At the time I was aware of them they were called the National Prayer and Fast Committee. They were a group organized particularly to just work on the Hill. They befriended Senate and House staffs. Their particular mission was just to become close and knowledgeable about the things that were going on on the Hill. At that time they had an office at the Washington Hilton. So, their effort was to, like I said, become close to those who were on the Hill.

Mr. FRASER. How many people were involved in that activity?

Mr. ELKINS. At the time it was first formed there were maybe a 12 to 15 here in Washington. At that time they were all young ladies, also. There is a similar crew in New York that works at the United Nations. But the last knowledge I had of it, it had grown and there were men also involved and there were probably 25, if not more. I can't remember the number exactly.

Mr. FRASER. Their responsibilities were just on the Hill?

Mr. ELKINS. Right.

Mr. FRASER. Not in other areas in Washington, but people who worked on the staffs of the Members or on the committees? It would be staff members primarily or was it Members of Congress?

Mr. ELKINS. Of course, the ideal was to get them close to Members of Congress. Usually you could not get to them except through their staffs.

Mr. FRASER. We have another vote underway. So, I think we had better take another 8-minute recess. We will be back in a few minutes.

[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.]

Mr. FRASER. The subcommittee will come to order.

I have just a couple of follow-on questions, Mr. Elkins, and I think I will be through.

You indicated that the planned attack on the Japanese Embassy was terminated after Mr. Salonen apparently made a call. He reported that the decision had been made by the White House for President Ford to visit Seoul, South Korea, on his visit to the Far East. Do you know how that information might have reached either Mr. Salonen or Reverend Moon?

Mr. ELKINS. We found out about it some time in the first week of September. The first time that the paper carried that Ford was going to Vladivostok was some time toward the end of September, the 21st,

somewhere around there. That was the earliest note I could find in the papers that he would go to Vladivostok or that he would stop in Seoul on his way to Vladivostok. This is speculation. The only speculation I have as to how we knew beforehand is that in the Nixon White House we had a contact. My recollection is his name was Joseph Kennedy. We called him Dr. Kennedy. I am not sure about his first name. I suppose he was still connected with the Ford White House because this was very soon after the change, in the month after Nixon had resigned. The only way I know we could have had any way of finding out would have been through him. You know, there is also a possibility of some other way we found out but if I had to speculate that is how I would speculate.

Mr. FRASER. You say Dr. Kennedy was a contact in the White House. Were there other occasions in which he was able to be helpful?

Mr. ELKINS. He arranged for the meeting between Moon and Nixon and got Moon into the prayer breakfast, the President's prayer breakfast, and such as that. I met with him personally a couple of times. I attended a conference on the Study of the Presidency out in Rosslyn, Va., I think is the name. At any rate, I met him personally there. He did have connections. I know any time we needed, you know, something of concern to the White House, we would go to him. He was our authority, though let me say he was not a member of the Unification Church that I know of.

Mr. FRASER. Was there a campaign of support for President Nixon in relation to the impeachment charge?

Mr. ELKINS. Yes; Moon issued a statement, I think he called it the Watergate statement, that we should forgive Nixon and should stand behind him until he was proven guilty. Of course, at that time we were absolutely, I would say almost absolutely, almost the only ones supporting Nixon. We were quite outgoing about it as far as—you know, in every State we had rallies and here in Washington also. You know, we really came out—in fact, when I was with the FLF, I know I went to Chicago and Nashville because the President was going to show up there. We were going to pro-Nixon rallies there when he was there.

Mr. FRASER. You actively sought to indicate support for President Nixon?

Mr. ELKINS. In fact, there were quite a few people who came to the Hill and came to the Congressmen's and Senators' offices.

Mr. FRASER. This was an organized activity?

Mr. ELKINS. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Under which banner was it organized so far as you can tell?

Mr. ELKINS. The Unification Church.

Mr. FRASER. Not under the Freedom Leadership Foundation?

Mr. ELKINS. Not to my knowledge. It was all church, Unification Church.

Mr. FRASER. With respect to the letterwriting campaigns you referred to earlier, can you give us some sense of how these developed? For example, where would the idea originate that there had to be letters written?

Mr. ELKINS. Well, any letters that went out of the office were 9 times out of 10 almost all the time written by Dan Fefferman. We were join-

ing efforts with a pro-Vietnamese student group, something like that, which we did at one time, you know. We did not want to see support for Vietnam crumble also. Southeast Asia was a major concern of ours, we would quite often join efforts with other groups who were concerned in these same areas and, you know, offer time—never money—either time or volunteers such as that to carry out these rallies or letterwriting, whatever needed to be done.

Mr. FRASER. From where would the directions come primarily to undertake such a letterwriting campaign?

Mr. ELKINS. I am sure we never did anything beyond the knowledge of Neil Salonen. Dan Fefferman ran the day-to-day activities and I know Mr. Salonen depended on Dan quite a bit. Who made the final executive decision, I would say Mr. Salonen did each time. Dan was always very instrumental in these things.

Mr. FRASER. Was there any case in which letters were written, say, to Members of Congress where the signer of the letter was not a real person?

Mr. ELKINS. That tactic I know was used but again I have heard it discussed, I didn't see it, I didn't do it, myself, but I heard that very tactic discussed.

Mr. FRASER. Do you happen to recall now what other sort of organizational titles the FLF may have used from time to time?

Mr. ELKINS. Well, we were involved in the World Freedom Institute, American Youth for a Just Peace, which was a Moon-dominated group. Stephens was a member of the American Youth for a Just Peace. They used that as a letterhead and campaigns symbol, too. Outside of those two names, Freedom Leadership Foundation, World Freedom Institute—of course, the Freedom Leadership Foundation published a paper called the Rising Tide—outside of using those names I have just mentioned, I cannot think of any others. I know that we have been members of ad hoc committees and such as that.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Elkins, there was a story in the Washington Post this morning reporting on an interview with you.

Mr. ELKINS. Yes, I read it.

Mr. FRASER. The article also contained a statement from a Unification Church spokesman. Mr. Michael Runyon, who described you as "a nice guy but a little immature and unstable." He suggested that you are motivated by your political ambitions. I mention this to you only in case you want to make a comment about that statement.

Mr. ELKINS. Thank you for the opportunity.

First of all, Michael Runyon could not pick me out of a crowd of people. I don't know how he could judge my character. I only occasionally even crossed paths with him in New York. We never were anywhere at the same time. I have no political aspirations. I think his statement was completely unfounded.

Like I said in my statement, I won't be surprised if my name is slandered as far as this testimony is concerned. But by all means I regret that it would come to that extent.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Elkins, I want to thank you for your appearance here this afternoon. I know it was under subpoena but you have been forthcoming in giving us the information that you have. If there is

any last statement you think would be helpful to the subcommittee, I would invite you to make it at this point.

Mr. ELKINS. I think that we have pretty well covered all the areas that I have spoken with any members of the committee about at this point.

Again, I don't intend any particular malicious attack on the Unification Church and its members. I feel they can believe in God the way they want. But when their activities begin to infringe on our rights, that is the only reason that I made my testimony available in the first place. Again, I just hope that the comments I saw in the paper today won't continue. Thank you.

Mr. FRASER. The subcommittee will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

ACTIVITIES OF THE KOREAN CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN THE UNITED STATES

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1976

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 9:10 a.m. in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald M. Fraser (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. FRASER. The subcommittee will come to order.

The Subcommittee on International Organizations meets today to hear the testimony of Neil A. Salonen, president of the Freedom Leadership Foundation with regard to allegations presented in sworn testimony before this subcommittee that certain persons and organizations associated with Sun Myung Moon have had, or have, a relationship with the South Korean Government, or with the KCIA.

This hearing, part of a 10-month old inquiry into illegal or improper activities of the Korean CIA in the United States, is being conducted pursuant to the authority and requirements of the Rules of the House of Representatives, specifically rule XI(1)(b), which authorizes committees to conduct investigations, and rule XI(2)(b) authorized the issuance of subpoenas in connection with this investigation.

While Mr. Salonen is not appearing under subpoena, but rather by agreement with the subcommittee, subpoenas were issued for Mr. Salonen's testimony and the production of certain documents and substitute service of those subpoenas was rendered on September 16, 1976, with the assistance of a U.S. marshal.

In keeping with the witness' request for an executive session hearing, the Chair will consider a motion that the subcommittee move into executive session, following which Mr. Salonen may offer a prepared statement, if he so desires. Is there a motion that the subcommittee now reconvene in executive session?

Mr. FASCELL. I so move.

Mr. FRASER. OK, all those in favor of convening in executive session—we have to have a rollcall, don't we?

Mr. BOETTCHER. Mr. Fraser.

Mr. FRASER. Aye.

Mr. BOETTCHER. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. Aye.

Mr. BOETTCHER. Mr. Rosenthal.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Aye.

Mr. BOETTCHER. Mr. Harrington.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Aye.

Mr. BOETTCHER. Mrs. Collins.

[No response.]

Mr. BOETTCHER. Mr. Derwinski.

[No response.]

Mr. BOETTCHER. Mr. Findley.

[No response.]

Mr. BOETTCHER. There are four "ayes."

Mr. FRASER. And no "nays" and the motion is carried, and accordingly the subcommittee will now convene in executive session, which means that we will excuse unauthorized persons from the committee room.

[Whereupon the subcommittee proceeded in executive session.]

APPENDIX 1

LETTER FROM BO HI PAK, PRESIDENT, KOREAN CULTURAL AND FREEDOM FOUNDATION, TO HON. DONALD M. FRASER

THE KOREAN CULTURAL AND FREEDOM FOUNDATION, INC.,
Washington, D.C., June 15, 1976.

HON. DONALD M. FRASER,
*Chairman, International Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I appreciate the courtesy of your invitation, extended by Mr. Mauzy, to appear before your Sub-committee.

There is nothing I can contribute to your investigation into the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in the United States or elsewhere.

I have talked with Mr. Mauzy at length. Also, I had the pleasure of talking with you, Mr. Mauzy being present, in your office June 9, 1976 for some two hours.

In these discussions I fully explained and, indeed, supported with documentation now in your hands, that there is no connection between your investigation and myself or with any organizations with which I am associated. Therefore, my appearance would not serve the purpose of your investigation.

Warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

BO HI PAK, *President,*

APPENDIX 2

LETTER FROM NEIL ALBERT SALONEN, PRESIDENT, FREEDOM LEADERSHIP FOUNDATION, TO ROBERT B. BOETTCHER (STAFF CONSULTANT, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS) DATED JUNE 17, 1976

THE FREEDOM LEADERSHIP FOUNDATION, INC.,
Washington, D.C., June 17, 1976.

Mr. ROBERT B. BOETTCHER,
*Staff Consultant, Subcommittee on International Organizations, U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. BOETTCHER: I was somewhat surprised at your letter of June 2, 1976 which was postmarked June 11 (see photostat of envelope) and received by me last Monday, June 14.

At my meeting with Congressman Fraser on Thursday, May 27th, I expressed an earnest willingness to provide information about our organization, its purpose and activities. However, your letter of invitation to appear at the June 22 hearing is apparently regarding activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency. I am quite certain that I would be unable to contribute anything to such a hearing.

As recently as last May 28th I held a public press conference in New York to emphatically deny a number of erroneous statements made in a prior newspaper article. I am enclosing a copy of the article covering that conference which I think clearly states my position.

If you can clarify to me how I might be of more assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Very truly yours,

NEIL ALBERT SALONEN, *President.*

(62)

APPENDIX 3

ARTICLE FROM THE BULLETIN OF CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS, OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1975 ENTITLED "PRESIDENT PARK AND HIS LEARNED FRIENDS: SOME OBSERVATIONS ON CONTEMPORARY KOREAN STATECRAFT" BY SUGWON KANG*

In 1969, eight years after his armed usurpation, President Park Chung Hee of South Korea had his country's constitution amended so that he could seek a third term. Three years ago, in October of 1972, as he was serving his last term under the new rules, Park declared martial law, dissolved the National Assembly and suspended the constitution. He did all this, as we were then told, in order that he might better cope with the "stark realities of a rapidly changing international situation."¹ He was referring to East-West détente, which he viewed as a deadly threat to one of the twin pillars of his legitimacy: anti-communism and economic modernization.

While the country was under martial law a new constitution was adopted in a "referendum" held in November, one which would permit Park to seek re-election without limit and under which he would have the power to appoint one-third of the national legislature and to dissolve the whole body if so desired. The constitution was hailed by Park's supporters as an embodiment of the principle of "separation of powers" with built-in "checks and balances," although, somewhat apologetically, they christened it the "Korean Style of Democracy." In December of that year Park was re-elected president by the newly created electoral college, with all but two of the 2,359 members voting for him. Those two remaining votes were declared invalid. He had been the only candidate.

Since then, President Park has been running the country with a remarkably steady hand by issuing numerous "emergency decrees"² and railroading other repressive measures through his hand-picked legislature. In addition, on February 12, 1975, he ordered and won another "referendum" which was supposed to reaffirm the nation's endorsement of the "Korean Style of Democracy."

It is impossible in the space of this article to document even the more grievous examples of the suffering that has been sustained by the people of South Korea in the wake of these extraordinary moves on Park's part. But the mechanism of terror and repression has included kidnappings, secret trials, jailings, tortures, mysterious disappearances, fatal "accidents," "suicides" in interrogation centers, pre-dawn executions, confiscation and cremation of victims' corpses. Much of this has received coverage in the leading American newspapers, and in reports of Amnesty International.³ But one facet of Park's statecraft has consistently

*I am deeply indebted to a number of colleagues who have generously provided oral and written answers to my numerous queries. Without these answers this paper would not have been possible. However, for reasons which should readily become apparent to the reader in the course of reading, most of them have asked not to be identified. Under these circumstances I thought it would be best if I did not mention any of them.

¹ Quoted from *Draft Amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Korea* (Seoul: Korean Overseas Information Office, 1972), p. 22.

² President Park has thus far issued nine "emergency decrees," between January 8, 1974, and May 13, 1975.

³ See Amnesty International's report on its mission to South Korea between March 27 and April 9 of this year, especially the section on "harassment and terror."

There is only one American journalist, as far as I know, who has come to the defense of the Korean regime. In December 1974, the syndicated columnist Jack Anderson released a series of three articles on South Korea while he was visiting Seoul on his "Christmas mission to seek the release" of the Christian leaders in jail. In the first article he defended the jailing of the Christian leaders by pointing out that they had been guilty of violating Park's emergency decrees. In the second article he argued that Park was not responsible for the 1973 kidnaping of his political opponent in Tokyo. Anderson wrote, "But he [Park] told me earnestly: 'I swear to God that I had nothing to do with this ugly affair.'" In his

(Footnote continued on next page)

escaped the view of the American reading public: his courtship of the intellectual community.

When a nation undergoes a political crisis of this dimension, its people look to their intellectual community for a fresh outlook, a critical perspective, if not an outright political alternative. This is particularly true of those nations, such as South Korea, which enjoy a relatively high rate of literacy. Yet, with a few notable exceptions,⁴ the Korean intellectual community has failed to speak out.

The effect of this failure has been all the more acutely felt because in Korea, a nation imbued with a Confucian bias, men of learning have always held a special claim to the society's trust and deference as spokesmen for what is deemed fair and proper. The government in Seoul recognizes this. Indeed, it is determined to help preserve that elitist image of the intellectuals so long as the intellectuals can be made to promote ideals of fairness and justice as the government sees them.

Some intellectuals are simply apathetic. Others prefer to remain silent because, understandably, they are fearful of political reprisals against their expression of dissent. But there are also those who believe that they can best serve their country as scholars and that they can best preserve their professional integrity through political neutrality.

These men argue that there is something inherently "unscholarly" and "un-professional" about taking a political stance on controversial issues, even if that means nothing more than voicing a sense of outrage and indignation at the sight of injustice and brutality. They fail to recognize or refuse to acknowledge that what they pursue as a life of disinterested inquiry is being exploited by the regime to its own political advantage. While the police round up dissidents, intellectuals of this frame of mind stand by with all the dignity and poise befitting a

(Footnote 3 continued)

third article this "investigative journalist" declared: "I found that Park's opponents are quite free to denounce him and to demonstrate against him." (See the *Washington Post*, December 5, 6, 7, 1974.)

Jack Anderson's friendship with the Seoul regime goes back to the early 1960s when he came to be acquainted with Hong Sung Chul and Kim Un Yong, both agents of the Korean CIA attached to the Embassy in Washington. Hong later became Minister of Home Affairs and Kim assistant director of the Presidential Protective Force. It was through these men that Anderson made his associations with Park Chong Kyu, then director of the powerful PPF; one suspects it was this Park who made the arrangements for Anderson's trip to Korea in December 1974, even though there is no reason to doubt that he made the trip also "at the urging of [the Korean] Christian leaders," as he told us in his first article.

⁴ Without doubt, the most remarkable of these exceptions is poet Kim Chi Ha, who has been in and out of jail ever since the publication of his "Five Bandits" in 1970. On February 15 this year, three days after the new referendum, Kim was released from prison along with Professor Kim Dong Gil of Yonsei University, Rev. Pak Hyong Kyu (Protestant), head of the outlawed Urban Industrial Mission and, the following day, the Most Rev. Daniel Chi Hak Soun (Roman Catholic). Not included in this Presidential clemency were the twenty-two persons convicted as members of the so-called People's Revolutionary Party, which many believe to be nonexistent. Shortly after Kim's release, the nation's leading newspaper *Dong-A-Ilbo* carried three installments of his descriptions of prison life, in which he charged that the alleged PRP members had been tortured into making false confessions. This led to Kim's re-arrest on March 14.

The alleged members of PRP had been tried by secret court martial, and the convictions of eight of them were upheld on April 8. None of the defendants was present when the Supreme Court delivered its final judgment; also absent were the defendants' lawyers, who were believed to have been under house arrest at that time. The hangings began at 4:50 the next morning inside the Seoul Penitentiary while 150 policemen stood guard outside. The following day, April 10, the police blocked the funeral service for one of the eight, seized the body and had it cremated without the family's consent, presumably to prevent a possible public demonstration that might have been triggered by the funeral procession. On April 11 a 23-year-old college student disemboweled himself to express his despair and indignation and died the next day.

Back to Kim Chi Ha. He is now awaiting a new trial. The charge is that he is a self-confessed "communist." Kim recently had a long "declaration of conscience" smuggled out of his cell in anticipation of the trial. (The full text was published in the Tokyo-based Korean newspaper *Minjok Shinbo* in its August 21 issue.) In it Kim states that he is not and has never been a communist and that some of the incriminating "confessions" he had signed were results of torture. For the English text, see "Declaration of Conscience from Prison," *Ampo*, Vol. 7, No. 3, July-September 1975.

The poet has been suffering from tuberculosis for many years and is now believed to be very frail. Even if his health holds out and even if he does not receive the death sentence, there is no assurance that he will not some day be pronounced a victim of "suicide." See Jerome Alan Cohen's "A Grim Anniversary in South Korea" in the October 9, 1974, issue of *The Washington Post*, recounting the jail murder of Professor Tsche Chong Gil in October 1973. See also reports of pre-October 1972 prison atrocities in the Hong Kong-based magazine *Ronin's* special issue (August 1972) on "Anti-Communism and Spies in South Korea."

proud profession, meditating upon the blessings of modernization or the "benefits of corruption in a developing nation."

Indeed, there is merit in the speculation that one of the reasons for the university students' repeated failure in recent years to spearhead the kind of drastic change that was once possible, in 1960, may have been their own teachers' betrayal of their historical trust as the conscience of the nation. There is no denying that the Syngman Rhee regime was tame in comparison to Park's: there are things intellectuals cannot do today, which they might have attempted during the Rhee years, without risking ugly consequences for themselves and their families. Still, ruthless as Park's regime is, fear plays but a small part in the making of today's moral paralysis of the intellectual community. The politics of withdrawal explains the Korean intellectuals' failure to respond effectively to the crisis of the times but not their complicity in generating that crisis.

Some intellectuals fail to live up to the expectations of their community without being indifferent, reticent or aloof. Far from it, they are very much involved. In fact, the word "fail" does not quite apply to these men because there is something furtive about their behavior. They wear the mantle of a scholar or that of a professor but freely engage in activities that are subversive to the ideals they profess, such as disinterestedness. I refer to those who belong, overtly or covertly, full-time or part-time, to that circle of elite courtesans in the service of the regime, whose responsibility is to provide a justification for every act of madness that has been committed by their leaders, explaining it away as some sort of a blessing in disguise or as historical inevitability. Most of them are recipients of advanced degrees from prestigious universities in the United States and have been trained in one of the social sciences.

One of their achievements is that of mastering the art of flexibility. At least until such time as their public roles are clearly defined for them by their superiors, they prefer to lead a life of studied ambivalence. When they are in the company of old friends all too familiar with their foibles, they demonstrate their power of discernment by making disparaging statements about the regime they serve, at times even making a lively forecast of its impending doom—taking care to add that their remarks are "off the record." When they feel defenseless about their lifestyle, they make frantic attempts to befuddle their onlookers by alternating the tone of their speech, with the virtuosity of a juggler, between seriousness and jest, so they can always say afterwards, if need be, that they were merely "joking."

Among these men of redoubtable agility the cleverest and the most persevering reach the top of the ladder. In recognition of their enviable Western training and of their proven ability to grasp the "stark realities" of this cheerless world, they are rewarded with glamorous posts. Some are appointed to the National Assembly,⁵ among whom the luckier ones become chairmen of its committees. Some are appointed Special Assistants to the President, others become ambassadors. Whatever their official functions may be, those believed to possess creative talents are entrusted with the task of fashioning the regime's official doctrines, even though their penchant for tautologies and non sequiturs prevents them from ever going beyond the coining of a phrase.⁶ The waiting line is long and the climb often

⁵ Of the seventy-three whom President Park appointed to the National Assembly total membership 219) twelve were university professors, ranking, as a group, second only to professional politicians totaling twenty-six.

⁶ Not that their phrases are always original. Of their many not-so-felicitous phrases the *pièce de résistance* is clearly, "Yu Shin," the official name for the one-man rule approved at the 1972 "referendum." It is translated into English as "Revitalizing Reforms," but is written in the same Chinese characters as that which in Japan stands for the Imperial Restoration of 1868. One wonders if it ever occurred to these theoreticians that adoption of a Japanese imperial label might pose an awkward problem for a leader of a one-time Japanese colony, not to mention the fact that this particular leader has the rare distinction of having fought on the side of the Japanese during the World War as an officer in the Imperial Army.

After winning another "referendum" on February 12 this year, Park and his intellectuals tried to refurbish the "Yu Shin" idea with the "Pan-National Political System," a doctrine which recalls the "Hundred Flowers" campaign of Mao Tse-tung in 1956-57, in efforts to disarm his ideological opponents in the name of accommodation and mutual criticism. Park told his nation, on February 13: "On this occasion let us all cooperate beyond social and personal barriers by joining our hands to build a golden tower of national prosperity." (*New York Times*, February 14, 1975)

"Pan-Nationalism" was dropped shortly thereafter, but "Yu Shin" is still frequently mentioned in official statements. Curiously enough, three years after the introduction of that myth of renovation we have yet to hear what it is that is being renovated.

treacherous. But many young men with kindred appetites and tastes feel it is worth a try. So they line up.

It goes without saying that there are not enough attractive positions to go around for all those who are interested. But the leaders, who are infinitely more astute in the art of manipulation than their predecessors of the Rhee era, know better than to disappoint those whom they cannot accommodate. They appoint them to such intellectual advisory bodies as the National Unification Board (a cabinet ministry), the Council of Professorial Evaluators (attached to the Office of the Prime Minister), the Korean Institute of Science and Technology (mainly for engineers), and the Korean Development Institute (mainly for economists).⁷ Some are sent abroad as technical consultants attached to some foreign mission. The government also invites large numbers of intellectuals to official parties and receptions, where they are given an opportunity to meet powerful people and their learned friends.

But by far the most effective method of bringing the intellectuals in line appears to be scholarly conferences. There are so many in Korea every year that it is well-nigh impossible to keep track of all of them. Most of these conferences are sponsored by various "research institutes" affiliated with universities. Some of these institutes are privately operated by business and political leaders (including one former cabinet minister) who like to be thought of and remembered as patrons of scholarship.

According to the estimate of *Dong-A-Ilbo*, approximately fifty such conferences were held in the first half of 1974 alone. This newspaper editorialized that "the sponsoring individuals seem more interested in exhibition than in substance."⁸ What the editorial failed to point out is that, in many of these instances, it is the Korean government which supplies the funds making these activities possible, though they are often funnelled through labyrinthine paths.

The government's enthusiasm for scholarly activities is by no means confined to the home front. Outside Korea its campaign to build an army of friendly intellectuals, a kind of pacification program for willing clients, is most evident in the United States, which has the largest concentration of Korean intellectuals abroad. There the Korean government has set up, through the initiative of its trusted intellectuals, "centers" and "institutes" that promote various scholarly and quasi-scholarly activities among Korea specialists. Some of these outfits even put out learned journals. Government funds are also used every year to finance conferences and symposia, all having to do with Korean studies.

In most cases, according to reliable sources, these funds originate in the Korean Central Intelligence Agency and are made available in cash through various front organizations to certain Korean scholars in the United States, mostly Korea specialists. These scholars in turn organize the above-mentioned gatherings, sometimes under the auspices of the government-financed centers or institutes and, occasionally, in conjunction with larger academic events of American origin.

According to the recent Congressional testimony of Professor Jai Hyon Lee of Western Illinois University—who resigned in June 1973 as Director of the Korean Information Office and chief Cultural and Information Attaché with the Korean Embassy in Washington, at considerable personal risk—the Korean Embassy in collaboration with the Korean CIA has been conducting a series of "clandestine operations" in this country aimed at muting the criticism of the Korean regime. These operations, according to Lee's testimony, consist of three techniques, "seduction, pay-off and intimidation." In the past two years the Korean government has been forced to reduce these activities sharply, owing in no small part to Professor Lee's much-publicized act of courage. But his testimony further reveals that many Korean intellectuals do not wait until they are reduced or intimidated. In explaining how scholarly conferences are organized to "rationalize Park's dictatorship or, at least to curb their [the scholars'] criticism," Lee said before the House International Relations Committee's Subcommittee on International Organizations:

"For example, such was a seminar held at Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan, shortly after Park's October, 1972, martial law. The embassy's educational attache who masterminded and paid off for this operation later

⁷ Reportedly, Park has issued an executive order to create an advisory group that would be made up mainly of social scientists.

⁸ *Dong-A-Ilbo* editorial of July 12, 1974.

boasted that, as a result, the organizer of the meeting wrote a letter to the New York Times in support of Park's police-state measures."⁹

Some of these conferences are of international scope, whether they are held in Korea or in the United States. The Lee testimony mentions one such example: the symposium in Washington, D.C., in April of 1973, on "Korea and the Powers in the 1970s," jointly sponsored by the Washington-based "Institute for Asian Studies" and by Kyung Nam University of Masan, Korea. "Paying the participants all the travel expenses and allowances," Professor Lee recalled, "the Seoul government financed this operation through a pro-Park Korean newspaper publisher in Washington, D.C."¹⁰

Within a year the youthful president of Kyung Nam University, who is the brother of President Park's then chief bodyguard, organized another conference, this time in Seoul, in collaboration with his Korean friend on the faculty of the City University of New York. The conference took place on January 21-24, 1974, and the visiting participants consisted of four scholars from Japan (one Korean) and fourteen from the United States (three Koreans), of whom eight were members of the CUNY faculty. It was billed as an "International Symposium on Peace and Security in East Asia."

This conference was severely criticized by the foes of the Park regime as an instance of intellectual sellout, particularly because, coincidentally, the conference was shortly preceded by three successive "emergency decrees" with which President Park intensified his repression of dissidents at home. But some scholars also denounced it heartily on grounds of mediocrity, pointing out that none of the eleven American scholars had anything directly to do with Korean studies and that they had been picked merely by virtue of their being either a former professor, present colleague or an associate of one of the organizers. Happily, there was another conference which was thought more prestigious and was able to accommodate some of those who had been left out.

On June 25-28 of the same year a Seoul-based organization with the title of "The Korean Institute of International Studies" put together its "Seventh International Conference" on the welcome theme: "Search for Peace: Alternatives to Confrontation in East Asia." The proceedings were subsequently published in three installments in the Institute's *The Korean Journal of International Studies*. This journal boasts an "International Advisory Board" which includes such familiar names as Roger Hilsman, Stanley Hoffmann, Herman Kahn, Robert Scalapino and Zbigniew Brzezinski. But the list also includes a few improbable names such as Raymond Aron. Among other items, this learned journal published "New Year Press Conference by President Park Chung Hee," running twenty-six pages in small print.¹¹

In addition to the thirty-four participants from within Korea and seven members of the National Assembly sitting as "observers," the "Search for Peace" was attended by fifteen scholars from nine foreign countries, including six from the United States (two Koreans). The conference was also adorned by the presence of the ambassadors of the United States, Japan, the Philippines, Australia and Canada. After all that trouble, however, this convention of international talents was unable to impress everyone. Just two weeks after its conclusion, *Dong-A-Ilbo* offered the following editorial observations on the comings and goings of foreign scholars:

"At those conferences that are of international nature, the foreign participants show both geographical diversity and distinguished past achievements. But the contents of their papers are either obsolete, i.e. stuff which they may have used in some journals many years ago, or collections of platitudes. One wonders if this is attributable to their hectic schedules."

⁹ Dr. Jai Hyon Lee's testimony of June 12, 1975. See *Congressional Record*, June 12, 1975 (E 3110-3113). The letter, "Korea Needs 'Sympathetic Understanding,'" was written by Professor Andrew C. Nahm and appeared in the *Times* on December 15, 1972. The Kalamazoo project was the joint invention of Ambassador Kim Dong Jo (later Foreign Minister), Education Attaché Kang Kyung Koo and KCIA representative Lee Sang Ho. In January the following year Kim Kang and Lee joined efforts with the visiting Education Minister Min Kwan Shik to give a reception for Korean professors and scholars in the United States, paying their expenses. (I was one of the sixty or so who attended the reception. That was my first such experience; I have never received another invitation since then.) Shortly thereafter Minister Min went to the University of Hawaii to make a government donation for the construction of a building that was to be used for the new Korean Studies Center at the East-West Center.

¹⁰ Lee, *op. cit.*

¹¹ *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Vol. VI, No. 2 (1975) pp. 91-117.

But the editorial was not content to leave the matter at that.

"We wish to stress our view that our precious foreign exchange and research funds would be more usefully spent in the assistance of our own scholars at home than in the promotion of the publicity of those research agencies that sponsor these conferences or in the procurement of stale stories which their participating scholars deliver."¹²

Obviously, the Korean government did not share this sentiment, because it does not always seek after foreign scholars for scholarly reasons. In a country where there is a certain mystique that goes with any mention of "Western" or "American," these Western scholars' presence adds prestige not only to the conferences themselves, at which they are carefully chosen guests, but also to the hosting government. The leaders see to it that these scholars' appearances receive maximum publicity by encouraging newspapers to run interviews, summaries of their papers or stories about their lives.

The visiting scholars like these trips because they get highly satisfying treatment as honored guests, in a country with a reputation for pampering foreign visitors. Furthermore, the scholars cannot see any harm in acquiring a reputation of their own as internationally sought-after experts in their fields. In any event, their travel expenses are invariably paid by the hosting groups, and often they pick up handsome honoraria for their papers. Frequently, their compensations include rounds of sumptuous parties plus the pleasures of call girls supplied to them by their hosts who are ever anxious to please their "foreign dignitaries."

Curiously, many of these scholars seem just as anxious to assure their colleagues back home that they are superior to their Korean hosts. Thus, when their visiting is over, they make elaborate efforts to convince their colleagues how uncomfortable they have felt while in Korea. They frequently speak of their hosts with contemptuous mirth, characterizing them as mindlessly extravagant. But these scholars are not as intolerant as they might at first seem, for most of them have been found returning to Korea to render further services.

The proliferation of conferences on Korean studies recently took an ambitious turn, not without a touch of comedy, when a group calling itself "The International Association of the Organizations for Korean Studies" came forward with the suggestion that from now on it represented all major centers of Korean studies throughout the world. Under the leadership of one Tokyo-based Korean scholar serving as "Secretary General," this international congress now speaks for "regional divisions," covering "Europe," "America," "Asia" and the "Pacific," each with a "representative." Although the term representation is nowhere sharply defined, it seems likely that these representatives were appointed by some hidden power rather than elected by their constituencies. For those Korea specialists in this country to whom I have spoken about this could not recall ever participating in the selection of the gentleman who is listed as the representative of the "American Division."¹³

The International Association held its "second general assembly" on July 1-8 in Seoul this year and has since reported the attendance of one hundred specialists from ten different nations. The prospectus for this undertaking including a special message from the Secretary General that the visiting scholars were being "kindly advised to abstain from any sensitive statements or acts which may be taken as 'political.'"

Seoul was the site of another major academic event earlier in the summer.¹⁴ On June 9-12 there was a joint conference of the Seoul-based Korean Political Science Association and the Association of Korean Political Scientists in North America, which has a membership of 139. This meeting calls for special mention partly because it was an all-Korean affair and partly because it did not address itself to Korean studies as such. Furthermore, it is expected to be repeated every year.¹⁵ The plane fare was paid by each visiting scholar but, to the relief of most, the precise nature of the management of the remaining expenses was kept in the dark, a challenge to the scholars' imaginations but no burden on their

¹² *Dong-A-Ilbo* Editorial, July 12, 1974.

¹³ One reason for the selection of this scholar for this position may have been that he runs an "institute" which publishes a journal on Korean affairs and has organized numerous conferences in recent years.

¹⁴ There is one major organization of Korean intellectuals abroad which I am not discussing in this article for the reason that its activities are not principally academic in nature: the Korean Scientists and Engineers Association in America, which has a membership of 1,170. It nevertheless arouses interests because it receives close to 90 percent of its income from the Seoul Government (84 percent of the total \$35,676 in 1973 and 87 percent of the total \$39,115 in 1974). Source: the *KSEA Letter*.

¹⁵ See footnote 17.

consciences.¹⁶ As many had expected, the whole undertaking was on the house, the total cost reaching, according to one estimate, \$120,000 for a thirteen-day period (June 8-20).

Immediately after their arrival at the airport, on June 8, the forty-one scholars were herded into waiting buses and were whisked off for an unannounced visit to the national cemetery where they were made to pay their respects to the late wife of President Park. Following a few days of conferences, which were punctuated by a series of receptions with some of Korea's leading industrialists and political notables, the scholars were taken on a tour of the front line where an army band cheered them with martial airs. Subsequently, their tour of the country included the CIA headquarters and the marvels of Korea's economic progress in various provinces, where the governors and their lieutenants came out to greet them with offerings. As if to reassure these scholars of their privileged status in society, their police-escorted buses even drove through red lights.

The climax of the trip was a visit to the Blue House, on June 20. The forty-one visiting scholars, together with a few representatives of the Korean political science group, were invited to meet the president. Shortly before the president made his appearance at the reception, the guests were politely but firmly exhorted to greet him with applause. They obliged, and handshakes followed.

Scenes of the reception were shown on the evening news. There were spontaneous exchanges of compliments between the host and his guests, and the atmosphere was jovial throughout. Even the surprise excursion to the cemetery seemed forgotten and forgiven. To many of the scholars it seemed incomprehensible how this small man with such a modest bearing could have inflicted so much pain and anguish upon his countrymen. Only one out of the forty-one visiting scholars seized the occasion to voice a note of dissent: he told Park that there was a "wall of alienation" that seemed to separate the president from his people. All indications are that the chief took this with magnanimity.¹⁷

Almost without exception, these conferences, both at home and abroad, are attended by the government's official intellectuals and, frequently, by the agents of the Korean CIA as well. The presence of KCIA agents is a stern reminder to the participating scholars that they are expected to behave in an uncontroversial manner; but the presence of official intellectuals, often those on the way up the ladder, is a challenge and inspiration to the aspiring. Identification of these intellectuals is never a problem. They make their presence felt by assuming a certain manner betraying casualness and familiarity which one associates with people in charge of a situation.

In short, the regime in Seoul is not content merely to enlist the services of some intellectuals who promote its cause by providing perpetually needed explanations and justifications. It reaches out for an even larger number and brings them into the proximity of power in the hope of securing their support and acquiescence. The oppressive aura of visible power can cause a slowing down of one's critical faculties. This, one suspects, is among the reasons why the leaders in Seoul like to periodically march their unsuspecting guests through the corridors of power, lined with visible reminders everywhere that life can be good to those intellectuals who will but renounce their professional pretensions and acknowledge that intellectuals are not critics but caudal appendages to men in power.

One of the most frequently heard arguments in defense of intellectuals' flirtation with power is that it is essential to the taming of power that its holders be kept in close touch with the voices of the intellectual community and that, if it were not for some intellectuals' mediative efforts, chances for communication between the house of power and the house of intellect would be hopelessly reduced. The problem in Korea, however, is not so much that there is not enough dialogue between the two contending houses but, rather, that through the political co-optation of the intellectual community dialogue has all but ceased to be a real issue. There is no creative tension between mind and power in Korea; one speaks for the other. This is no small feat in statecraft.

¹⁶ I had originally planned to go to the conference but later decided not to go, with a letter of explanation sent to the leaders of the group (of which I am a member), after receiving reports that the Korean government was going to finance the conference.

¹⁷ A glimpse of this reception may be found in an article that appeared in the June 21 issue of *Dong-A-Ilbo*: "President Park Meets With the Political Scientists Living in the United States." Park is quoted as saying: "It is our hope that scholars in Korea [political scientists] and those abroad will get together and organize annual conferences, having them in Seoul one year and in the United States the following year, thus rotating the location." According to one report, when a Korean-based political scientist pointed out that it would cost him and his colleagues in Korea too much to travel to the United States, the president immediately ordered one high-ranking official standing nearby to see to it that travel allowances would be provided for conference held away from home.

APPENDIX 4

TRANSCRIPT OF THE NBC-TV, PROGRAM, "WEEKEND",¹ SATURDAY,
MAY 1, 1976

DOBYNS

There are about two hundred thousand Koreans now living in the United States . . . fewer than half are citizens but all foreign residents are by law entitled to our basic rights.

This is a story of how some Koreans are not secure in those rights because of the work of the Korean Intelligence Agency the KCIA.

DOBYNS

[film footage]

He is a campaign worker . . . not in the politics we know but in the San Francisco Korean Resident's Association voting earlier this year. Such associations are important to Koreans in the United States so they are important to the Korean Government in Seoul.

[film footage]

Just as a campaign worker will do what he must to get votes, so will Korean dictator Park do what he can, to stifle criticism by Koreans . . . even those abroad. So these candidates, smiling and shaking hands, were not the dominant figures in the campaign . . . Park was.

The campaign was for and against Park government and Korean residents in San Francisco were pressured to take sides. Some of that pressure, it is said, came from the Korean CIA. The anti-Park side charged that the pro-Park campaign was directed and financed by a KCIA agent in the San Francisco consulate. It is also charged that the outgoing president in the dark suit cooperated with the KCIA.

[film footage]

All charges were denied but opponents insist that interference in these elections is common.

Lee J. Yun is a former diplomat who got political asylum here in 1973.

YUN

From way back now, now the embassy has money to do that, and I can't tell the amount but I do know they have money, a budget set aside for that sort of operation in the embassy.

DOBYNS

In Washington, the KCIA works out of the Korean Embassy, there are 11 agents there.

Donald Ranard, former head of the State Department's Korean Desk, knows the KCIA.

RANARD

In time the Director of the KCIA came to be more powerful and feared at home than the Prime Minister—and abroad its Chief of Station, another term borrowed from the American experience—was accepted by Korean Embassy personnel as more influential than the Korean Ambassador.

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DOBYNS

Kim Yung Wan, former Air Force Attache, lives modestly in Arlington, he is the current KCIA Station Chief.

In the Washington-Korean community, Kim is known as a "nice guy," one who often attends fund raising dinners like this one.

Many agents are called nice guys . . . but the KCIA is anything but a nice organization.

HENDERSON

It is impossible for most Americans to imagine to what an extent this giant state within a state has set man against man, sown suspicion throughout the land.

DOBYNS

Professor Gregory Henderson was one of several witnesses who testified about the KCIA before a House Subcommittee. They told of political repression, deprivation of legal and human rights, torture of political prisoners, mysterious deaths and international kidnappings. There were charges that the KCIA tries to buy-off or neutralize American officials, a specific charge of a bribe paid to two Congressmen is under investigation.

YUN

And when you seduce somebody and pay him off, that offer is always in cold-cash so that will leave no trace of it.

DOBYNS

The job of the KCIA is to keep dictator Park Chung-hee in power and to keep his enemies quiet, even if they have to kill them to do it.

Park took over in a 1961 military coup climaxing a checkered military career. He first saw service as an officer in the Japanese Imperial Army fighting against Koreans in Manchuria. Later, he joined a Communist-inspired rebellion in the Korean Army . . . then saved himself by turning informer. When the Korean War came, he was kept to non-combat duties. In 1963, Park restored civilian rule, took off his uniform, ran for President and was elected twice. Then, he had a Constitutional Amendment pushed through so he could run for President a third time. In that 1971 election, Park won a narrow victory.

[film footage]

His opponent, Kim Dai-Jung, got 47 percent of the vote . . . even in the official count.

[film footage]

That was far too close for Park.

In 1972, he did away with the Constitution and gave himself sweeping executive power. Koreans reading the announcement noticed that Park had given himself the right to be President for life.

[film footage]

The student riots that followed were put down by army troops . . . Korean students were a powerful political force.

In 1974, to keep them in line, Park made student protest a crime . . . punishment death. That last five months.

But Park's control of the news media is still going on and KCIA censors stay right in the newsroom checking every word. Anything that gets printed goes out with KCIA approval.

[film footage]

Koreans do have religious freedom . . . so long as they don't use that religion to criticize the dictatorship.

But, among the ten percent, who are Catholic and Protestant, there is wide anti-Park feeling. Some Korean leaders have been arrested by Park's troops . . . some were jailed . . . two American missionaries were deported.

[film footage]

Forty thousand American troops still remain in Korea to guard against another Communist invasion from the north, a very real possibility that Park uses to justify his dictatorial power.

[film footage]

By doing things like digging troop tunnels into the South, the Communist north helps keep Park in power and allied with the United States despite his excesses and lawbreaking.

[film footage]

This man knows about that; he is Essan-Yun a Korean composer who lives in West Berlin.

In 1967, the KCIA wanted him and 16 others back in Korea . . . so they kidnapped them. Korean authorities claimed they were breaking up a Communist spy ring, they said Yun was a ringleader.

YUN

Early, on June 17, 1967 . . .

DOBYNS

Yun had been to the North Korean Embassy in East Berlin and to the capital of North Korea. In West Berlin, the KCIA lured him from his home by a phone call and snatched him when he went to the Korean Embassy in Bonn. He was kept in the attic, there, for two days and subjected to psychological pressure but no physical torture.

Then the KCIA took him to the airport in Hamburg and somehow got him onto a Japanese Airline's plane . . . even though he never showed his passport or bought a ticket.

He wound up in Seoul.

YUN

As soon as I arrived there in Seoul, I was taken to the headquarters of the KCIA and they bound my hands and feet and covered my head with a wet towel on which they constantly kept spraying water. With hands and feet bound, they suspended me from a pole, beat me with wooden sticks and kicked me, during this I fainted at least ten times. They insisted that I sign a confession which they had prepared.

I finally signed it because I was afraid to die.

DOBYNS

It took two years but German diplomatic pressure got Yun released.

YUN

Just before I came back to Germany the Chief of the KCIA told me that I should not talk about this and threatened that they would find and take care of me wherever I would be. This man called Kim lives now in New York.

DOBYNS

Kim denies there was any torture but proudly admits his part in the international kidnapping, he says it broke up a Communist spy ring.

He is now out of favor with Park, he lives in luxurious exile in a quarter-million-dollar home in Northern New Jersey.

In 1973, Kim Dai-Jung, who had almost defeated Park earlier, was kidnapped from his hotel in Tokyo by KCIA agents. Despite Japanese protests, he was taken to Korea and tried for alleged campaign violations. He has since been in and out of jail.

Last year Park granted amnesty to more than two hundred political prisoners, many of them students, but for some reason political arrest is the end of the road.

These eight men were charged with a Communist plot, tried by military court, convicted on the flimsiest of evidence . . . and the next day before they could appeal they were hanged.

[film footage]

One of Park's opponents died from a blow to the head . . . police called it a hiking accident.

[film footage]

A Harvard law graduate was arrested for defending students . . . four days later he was dead.

Incidentally, some of those released are already back in jail.

Sometimes Koreans organize demonstrations to protest against Park . . . but protest in Washington is not without risk. Under Park's decree it is a crime to criticize Park or his new Constitution . . . no matter where you are inside or outside Korea . . . it gets you fifteen years in jail. American rights don't matter.

[film footage]

The KCIA tries, often successfully, to censor the Korean press in the United States . . . just as it does in Korea.

In Washington, a reporter finally quit rather than obey KCIA orders to distort his stories.

The greatest single concentration of Koreans in this country is in Los Angeles so there is an active press there.

Kim Woun Ha is editor of "New Korea" an anti-Park weekly journal of opinion. Before he came here he was a reporter and editor in Korea.

KIM

I guided a movement for press freedom. At that time, the Korean CIA summoned me.

DOBYNS

Kim was acting president of the Korean Journalist's Association, leading a crusade for press freedom . . the KCIA forced him out.

He came to this country, became editor of New Korea and wrote anti-Park articles. At first the KCIA offered financial help if he would play along. When that didn't work, they tried threats. And, when that didn't work, they fell back on a tactic that had worked well for them in Korea.

KIM

The Korean CIA and Korean Consular officers here in Los Angeles are now applying very brutal tactics to my newspaper. First, they pressure the major advertisers to cancel the contract with my newspaper, for example the Korean Airline and the Korean Exchange Bank of California and (name) realtor.

DOBYNS

Both the airline and the bank deny they were pressured by the KCIA, the local realtor has been quoted as saying she couldn't stand the pressure but now denies she ever said that . . . at any rate Kim is surviving but afraid.

KIM

I am very afraid of my life and I am worried about my children, they're in Seoul, Korea.

[film footage]

DOBYNS

Most of the two hundred thousand Koreans in the United States have family ties in Korea and most are not yet United States citizens, it makes them vulnerable to threats.

Korean business men are particularly vulnerable because, along with the rest of it, they are dependent on exports from Korea, they have to go along, even when the KCIA virtually extorts money from them.

This business man feared retaliation, so we filmed him in shadow.

KOREAN BUSINESS MAN

Through the agents of the KCIA they are collecting the defense fund from the different Korean people in this community and they are forcing business men to donate some defense funds. They are actually forcing to pay.

[film footage]

DOBYNS

Along with the journalists and business men, Korean academics get special attention. A Toronto conference on Asian Studies was offered three thousand dollars by a KCIA front to pay the expenses of pro-Park scholars . . . the offer was refused.

Two months earlier, Professor T. C. Rhee was advised by the embassy to either dilute his paper or not present it . . . the paper was anti-Park.

Rhee, who is an American citizen, tells how part of the telephone conversation went.

RHEE

The threat went something like this the person was referring to a man's name who happened to be known to both of us a graduate of the most prestigious department in the Seoul National University, Department of Political Science, and he was asking me do you know the person? So I said certainly I do. And he said do you know how he spent his life for the last fifteen to twenty years? And I said I don't have that knowledge. He said well he had been in prison all this time.

[film footage]

He went on mentioning about my children, asking, you know, how many children I had, how old are they, you know.

DOBYNS

Here, in Sproul's Plaza, Rhee or any American citizen has the right to say almost anything. Sproul Plaza, at the University of California at Berkeley, is famous for that. Five years ago, Elaine Kim, an American citizen, exercised her right denouncing Japanese and American control of Korea.

KIM

After I finished giving that talk, which was about a ten minute talk, six men with dark glasses, about five or six men came up to me and asked me to go, or took me with them to a basement room on the campus and they told me that in the future if I were going to talk in a public place in America about Korea I should limit myself to talks about cultural things and not about political things. They didn't say who they were, they said they were people, interested people from San Francisco. I knew who they were . . . well I'm sure they were from the Korean CIA.

[film footage]

DOBYNS

Within limits, anyone has the right to demonstrate in the United States and demonstrations usually attract photographers, but at this Korean demonstration in New York two weeks ago this photographer was suspected of working for the Korean Consulate.

[film footage]

So Producer Jim Gannon went over and asked.

GANNON

You're not working with the consulate in any way?

WOMAN

I'm working for them also.

GANNON

You're working for the consulate also?

WOMAN

Right.

GANNON

Are you taking pictures, here, of the demonstrators on behalf of the consulate?

WOMAN

Yes, but part of my pictures go back to Korea.

DOBYNS

So her pictures do get sent back to Korea . . . it's just one way the Park Government operates in this country.

We have been told there are about 25-KCIA agents, under diplomatic cover, working in the United States. Their network is buried in community, church and academic groups, business firms and news organizations. . . . That is illegal . . . but to the best of our knowledge the only thing being done about it is being done by one congressman, Donald Fraser of Minnesota, who is holding hearings. We asked the Korean Embassy in Washington if it would care to comment on this report. Kim Su Dak, Minister for Culture and Information, said "there is no KCIA in the United States."

APPENDIX 5

[From the New York Times, May 27, 1976]

SEOUL OFFICIALS DENY LINKS TO MOON SECT¹

SEOUL, South Korea, May 26—South Korean officials said today that the Government of President Park Chung Hee was in no way linked with the Rev. Sun Myung Moon.

Some said privately that they were annoyed by the evangelist's controversial activities overseas.

These statements came in response to requests for comment on an article published yesterday in The New York Times reporting that the South Korean Government and the Korean Central Intelligence Agency provided assistance to a number of individuals and organizations connected with Mr. Moon and that these groups devoted much of their time to building support for the Park Government in the United States.

"We have no connection whatsoever with Moon," Kim Dong Whie, the Deputy Minister of Culture and Information, said.

Buttressing this official denial, a senior officer of the ministry, whose province includes religious affairs, said what Mr. Moon does abroad "fundamentally falls under the law of the country in which he operates."

The Deputy Information Minister said he was also embarrassed by The Time's report that followers of Mr. Moon had taken a pledge to die for South Korea in the event of a war.

"The Koreans are strong and united enough to do this themselves," he said.

A number of South Korean legislators and newspaper editors have been invited privately to attend the "God Bless America" rally that Mr. Moon's Unification Church is holding in Yankee Stadium on June 1, but South Korean political parties have reportedly ordered the legislators to decline the invitations. Some editors have also turned down the offer, to avoid, they said, being linked with Mr. Moon.

Similarly, most local newspapers here did not report today on The Times article about Mr. Moon and the organizations associated with him. This was contrary to their usual practice of quoting foreign publications to report news that they themselves would not print.

Despite these attitudes, Mr. Moon and his church are not as controversial in South Korea as they are in the United States.

His detractors say the church's following here is about 30,000, in contrast to 400,000 claimed officially. But small as this number is in proportion to the total Christian population here, estimated to be nearly four million, the Moon followers are widely known for their Spartan discipline, militant anti-Communism and thriving business empire that stretches from a machinery plant to a ginseng tea factory.

Besides these businesses, whose total value is estimated at more than \$200 million, the church operates an anti-Communism training center outside Seoul. Village leaders, teachers and other officials often gather there for a week or more of political training.

The center's programs are mostly theoretical rebuttal of Marxism and lectures on the Russian Revolution and Communist atrocities during the Korean War.

The programs being mainly ideological courses, Moon aides maintain they should not be confused with drumming up support for the government or championing their theology.

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But churches here remain deeply distrustful of Mr. Moon. Dr. Samuel Shahoon Shin, a theologian and professor at Seoul National University, has emotionally branded him a "Satan." A second anti-Moon activist has asked the South Korean Government to ban his activities altogether on the ground that they are harming South Korea's prestige abroad.

MISSION DENIES LINK

A denial of any link between the South Korean Government and Mr. Moon was also issued yesterday in New York by the South Korean mission to the United Nations.

"There is simply no such connection," said a statement issued by Toh Sang Moon, the mission's press attaché.

APPENDIX 6

[From the Oregonian (Portland), June 10, 1976]

KOREAN'S GIFT TO REPRESENTATIVE BONKER OF WASHINGTON RAISES PROPRIETY QUESTIONS

(By Bill Keller)

WASHINGTON—A South Korean legislator has told reporters in his country that a digital wristwatch he gave Washington Rep. Don Bonker was “a personal gesture of friendship,” not intended to influence the young Democrat’s vote on the House International Relations Committee.

The Korean lawmaker, Young-dal Ohm, also said the watch, which Bonker says he mailed back, cost \$23 and thus was under the \$50 limit on gifts federal employees can legally accept from foreign emissaries.

A spokesman for the Korean Embassy in Washington declined comment except to read Ohm’s statement from an interview with the Korea Times. Neither the interview nor the embassy spokesman mentioned two other offers allegedly made to Bonker, a free trip to Korea and the company of a woman.

Bonker said Wednesday he felt the episode had been “terribly exaggerated.”

In interviews Tuesday, Bonker and an aide, Mark Bisnow, described their encounters with Ohm and Col. Yas-huen Choi, the Korean legislative liaison.

Bisnow said Choi had told him during a phone conversation in February that “we have an attractive Korean woman who would be pleased to meet with the congressman on matters of mutual interest.”

While Bisnow said the implication was clear to him that this was an offer of a sex partner, Bonker said he was inclined to believe his aide may have been reading too much into it.

Bisnow reported the alleged offer to Richard Mauzy, a researcher for a House subcommittee investigating activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency. Mauzy said Wednesday he recalled talking to Bisnow immediately after the incident, but felt there was not enough evidence to pursue it.

Mauzy said the subcommittee has heard other allegations that Koreans offered trips, honorary degrees and women to American legislators.

“The unfortunate part is the only ones you’ll ever hear from are the ones who turn it down,” Mauzy said.

The other offers to Bonker came when Choi and Ohm dropped in uninvited on the Washington congressman a few days after the colonel’s phone call.

At the time the House International Relations Committee, of which Bonker is a member, was weighing potential American troop cutbacks in South Korea, an idea Bonker favors.

Bonker said Ohm invited him to visit Korea at the government’s expense, and left behind a digital watch which appeared valuable. He said he declined the trip and mailed back the watch.

Bonker emphasized he did not construe the offers as “bribes,” though he believes it is improper for members of Congress to accept any gratuities from foreign emissaries.

The watch episode surfaced as an item in a gossip column in the Washington Post in March, where it apparently went largely unnoticed.

A Korean reporter asked Ohm about the incident in a story published April 7 in Korea.

In the interview, Ohm said the watch he offered Bonker was a Korean-made model worth \$23, and accused the Washington Post of raising the issue “for political purposes.”

"As a matter of fact, I have known Rep. Bonker since last year, when I visited America and found some things in common with him, and so sought his friendship," the legislator said, as interpreted by an embassy spokesman.

"The watch I gave him was nothing but a token of personal friendship and when I gave it to him I did not forget to make clear that it was a legal gift worth less than \$50."

"According to the news report, Rep. Bonker immediately mailed the watch back to me," Ohm continued. "But I haven't received it. It should already have reached me if he really mailed it."

Ohm did not mention his offer of a trip to Korea—which would have violated the \$50 rule—because it was not raised in the first news account.

Ohm went on to call the story "a malicious, calculated attempt by the newspaper to make ill use of a personal gesture of friendship for political purposes," and said the incident had put him in "a perplexed position" with regard to his own government.

APPENDIX 7

JAPANESE-KOREAN RELATIONS: AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 1974: A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS, PREPARED BY BILL GARVELINK¹

- August 1—Daniel Chi Hak Soun, a South Korean Roman Catholic Bishop, is brought before a military court in Seoul for allegedly aiding anti-Park students in a plot to overthrow the Park regime.
- August 1—Representative Donald Fraser (D-Minn.) advocates that Congress reduce or eliminate the \$234,300,000 in United States military aid to South Korea, because of President Park's violations of human rights in his own country. The Administration opposes any reduction in aid to South Korea.
- August 1—Japanese Foreign Minister Toshio Kimura says that it will be difficult to hold the annual cabinet-level Japanese-South Korean meeting concerning economic aid to South Korea, because of the Park government's failure to resolve the Kim Dae Jung kidnapping.
- August 2—Kimura announces that China and Japan are "on very satisfactory terms" since the two nations established diplomatic relations in September, 1972.
- August 7—Sixty South Koreans are secretly put on trial. Most of them are students at Sogang University, a Catholic school in Seoul.
- August 8—South Korea sentences twenty-six students to three to fifteen years in prison and places nineteen more on trial. They are charged with formulating a communist plot to overthrow the Park regime. The students are alleged to be members of a National Democratic Youth Student League, an organization unknown to knowledgeable observers.
- August 9—Bishop Daniel Chi Hak Soun is sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Seventy-seven year old Yun Po Sun, President of South Korea in 1960, is given a three year suspended sentence for alleged complicity in a communist plan to overthrow the Park regime.
- August 12—North Korea rejects the United Nations Command's request to withdraw military troops and weapons from the DMZ as long as United States troops remain in South Korea.
- August 13—Colonel Mizuho Yashihara is Japan's first military attaché to be assigned to Peking since World War II.
- August 13—Thirteen South Korean students are sentenced by a general court-martial to ten to twenty years in prison for allegedly participating in a plot to overthrow the Park regime. The students are members of the Korean Christian Student Foundation.
- August 13—The Senate Appropriations Committee subcommittee on defense approves a measure to restrict all forms of aid to South Korea to about \$120 million, as opposed to the administration's request for \$237 million.
- August 13—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee slashes an Administration bill asking for \$161.5 million in military assistance for South Korea to \$75 million.
- August 14—Thirty-six South Koreans are placed on trial in Seoul, bringing the number of persons to receive death sentences or long prison terms under Park's emergency decrees since the beginning of the year to 194.
- August 14—The American Jesuit Missions Conference protests the arrest and conviction of Bishop Chi and other South Korean students and political leaders in a letter addressed to Stephen Cardinal Kim, Archbishop of Seoul.
- August 14—South Korea announces that the probe into the kidnapping of Kim Dae Jung is being halted for lack of evidence.

¹ The sources for this chronology are the *Japan Times*, the *New York Times*, and the *Washington Post* for August and September 1974.

- August 14**—The Japanese government protests the end to the Kim case. South Korean investigators found the fingerprints of Kim Dong Woon, an alleged KCIA agent, at the scene and established his car as the one used in the abduction.
- August 15**—Japan agrees to help China develop its oil fields.
- August 15**—Mun Se Kwang, a South Korean living in Japan, attempts to assassinate President Park and fatally wounds Mrs. Park.
- August 16**—The anti-Park associations of South Koreans living in Japan, Kansai and Kanminto, are harassed by the pro-Park group, Mindan.
- August 16**—South Korean investigators claim to have connected the assassin to Park's enemies—communist North Korea, Kim Dae Jung, and Japan. Investigators claim that Mun is a communist and was active in efforts to rescue Kim Dae Jung and that Japan failed to suppress Mun and the organization he belonged to.
- August 17**—South Korean investigators claim that Kim Il Sung, President of North Korea, ordered the attempt on Park's life. Officials in Japan and the United States are skeptical of South Korea's evidence.
- August 17**—The Soviet Union, China, and thirty other African and Asian nations want the United Nations troops (38,000 United States troops under the United Nations flag) to leave South Korea.
- August 19**—South Koreans demonstrate in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul.
- August 20**—South Korean students hold an anti-Japanese demonstration in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul.
- August 20**—The Senate Appropriations Committee calls for a reduction of 25,000 troops stationed overseas, preferably from Asian locations.
- August 21**—South Koreans hold an anti-Japanese demonstration in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul.
- August 22**—South Korea announces that Mun confesses that he was ordered by North Korea to kill Park.
- August 22**—South Koreans hold an anti-Japanese demonstration in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul.
- August 23**—The fifth straight day of anti-Japanese demonstrations in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul demanding that Japan admit responsibility for the attempted assassination of President Park.
- August 23**—Park lifts two emergency decrees: the January 8, 1974 decree which prohibited criticism of the constitution or demands for its revision, and the April 3, 1974 decree which banned student protests under penalty of death.
- August 23**—Prominent South Korean novelist Nam Jung Hyun, jailed four months ago and held without charge, is freed.
- August 23**—Park decrees a ban on all anti-government demonstrations in South Korea.
- August 24**—Congress and other prominent South Korean experts begin to discuss the withdrawal of United States troops from South Korea. The experts are beginning to favor this due to their fear that Park's unpredictability and repressive measures might involve the United States in a Far Eastern war.
- August 26**—Seoul expresses dissatisfaction with Japan's cooperation in investigating the attempted assassination of President Park. According to South Korea's Ambassador to Japan, this could "seriously effect" Japanese-South Korean relations.
- August 26**—South Koreans hold an anti-Japanese demonstration in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul.
- August 27**—North Korea claims that Park is trying to increase tensions between the two Koreas for his own benefit by saying that the would-be assassin was under orders from North Korea.
- August 27**—South Korea asks for a postponement of the annual bilateral trade talks with Japan.
- August 27**—Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka announces that he will visit President Ford in Washington in September of this year.
- August 28**—Congress calls for a reduction of troops in South Korea. The Administration opposes such a move.
- August 28**—South Korean officials call for diplomatic action against Japan if it does not admit responsibility for the near assassination of President Park.

- August 28—Several hundred South Korean women stage an anti-Japanese protest in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul.
- August 28—North Korea denounces South Korea for its allegations that North Korea engineered the assassination attempt on President Park. The North Koreans see Park's claim as a sign that he is losing control over his country.
- August 29—Foreign Minister Kimura states that the Japanese government does not believe that North Korea is a threat to South Korea.
- August 29—South Korea says that Kimura's statement contradicts its position and asserts that Japan is allowing itself to become a base for North Korean subversive activities in South Korea.
- August 30—South Korea asks Japan for clarification of Kimura's statement.
- August 30—Kimura reiterates his view that there is no real threat of military conflict between North and South Korea.
- August 30—President Park Chung-Hee personally warns the Japanese Ambassador that unless Japan agrees to his demands concerning the attempt on his life, relations between the two nations will deteriorate rapidly and he might not be able to restrain the violence of the anti-Japanese demonstrators any longer.
- September 3—President Ford sends a letter to South Korea expressing his concern over the deteriorating relations between Japan and South Korea.
- September 3—Britain, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United States ask the United Nations General Assembly to maintain United Nations troops in South Korea. This is a countermove to the proposal of thirty-two nations which requested in August that United Nations forces be removed from South Korea.
- September 4—A South Korean military court sentences a defense lawyer to ten years in prison for violating one of the emergency decrees while he was defending his client, dissident poet Kim Chi Ha, in a military trial.
- September 5—In a speech before the Diet, Foreign Minister Kimura supports the view that South Korea is not the only lawful government on the Korean Peninsula.
- September 6—South Korea announces that Kimura's statement runs counter to traditional Japanese-South Korean relations and could have an adverse effect on the ties between the two nations.
- September 6—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommends cuts in military aid to South Korea and that all aid be phased out by 1977.
- September 6—Vice Premier of North Korea Park Sung Chul accuses the Park government of using the assassination attempt as an occasion to further suppress the people of South Korea, and as an incident to stir up tensions between the two Koreas.
- September 6—South Koreans demonstrate in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul. Some offices are ransacked, an Embassy car burned, and several employees are injured.
- September 6—The Japanese government lodges a formal protest with the South Koreans regarding the demonstration in Seoul.
- September 6—President Ford says he will visit Japan in November.
- September 7—South Korea's Ambassador to Japan apologizes for the incident at the Japanese Embassy in Seoul.
- September 7—Two Japanese citizens are sentenced to twenty years in a South Korea prison for allegedly aiding anti-Park students in a plot to overthrow the Park regime while they were visiting in South Korea.
- September 7—A crowd of 600 rock-throwing South Koreans demonstrate in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul.
- September 8—An anti-Japanese demonstration takes place at the Japanese Embassy in Seoul.
- September 9—South Korea demands that Japan send a special envoy to Seoul with a letter from Tanaka admitting guilt for the assassination attempt on President Park and with a promise to suppress the Chongryun.
- September 9—South Koreans demonstrate in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul.
- September 10—South Koreans demonstrate in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul.
- September 10—A Washington official reveals that Ford is likely to visit South Korea after his stop in Japan.

- September 10—Japan agrees to send an envoy to Seoul with a letter from Tanaka.
- September 11—South Koreans conduct a rock-throwing demonstration in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul.
- September 12—Evidence is revealed that the anti-Japanese demonstrations in Seoul are being planned by the Park regime.
- September 12—Rock-throwing South Koreans demonstrate in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul.
- September 12—Japan and South Korea are split over the contents of the Tanaka letter.
- September 13—The United States issues a statement of concern over the situation in the Far East.
- September 13—Anti-Japanese demonstrators battle with police within one hundred feet of the Japanese Embassy.
- September 13—Japanese living in South Korea begin to make plans for the evacuation of South Korea.
- September 14—Twenty-four South Koreans are arrested for entering Japan illegally in a fishing boat. The South Koreans say that the living conditions are too harsh in their homeland and they want to live in Japan.
- September 14—The State Department reveals that the United States is actively engaged in trying to work out a settlement between Japan and South Korea, primarily by applying pressure on the Park government to come to terms with Japan.
- September 14—According to testimony before the House Subcommittee on International Organizations the Freedom Leadership Foundation (FLF) plans to egg the Japanese Embassy in Washington at noon, the time the Ambassador usually leaves the Embassy. The FLF is to remain anonymous.
- September 14—An anti-Japanese demonstration, organized by the Freedom Leadership Foundation, takes place at DuPont Circle. The demonstration is called off shortly afterward.
- September 15—South Korea basically accepts Japan's compromise proposal.
- September 15—A small and passive anti-Japanese demonstration occurs in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul.
- September 17—Japan's special envoy Etsusaburo Shiina's trip to Seoul is delayed.
- September 19—Japanese demonstrate in Tokyo for their government to take a stronger stand against the demands of the Park regime.
- September 19—Shiina visits Seoul and explains the contents of the Tanaka letter to President Park.
- September 20—Japan and South Korea officially resolve their differences. Tensions actually still run high between the two nations.
- September 20—The United States military resists suggestions to remove atomic weapons from South Korea.
- September 20—A Chinese industrial fair opens in Tokyo. China also announces its plans to supply Japan with one-third of its oil needs by the early 1980s.
- September 20—President Ford announces that he will visit South Korea after Japan.
- September 21—Japanese Premier Tanaka meets with President Ford at the White House.
- September 23—President Park reduces the prison terms of nineteen persons convicted of violating his decrees forbidding political dissent.
- September 23—Four thousand students of South Korea's largest woman's college hold a prayer meeting and collect signatures on a petition requesting the release of all students held prisoner by the Park government. This is the first visible sign of student discontent in South Korea since October, 1973.
- September 24—The House International Relations Committee accepts Congressman Fraser's amendment to cut the administration's request for \$161.5 million in military aid to South Korea to \$100 million.
- September 27—The State Department says that President Ford's stop in South Korea is based on the understanding that the Park government will ease its crackdown on political opponents in the near future, but it is not a condition for the visit.

APPENDIX 8

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ON SEPTEMBER 1, 1976, AUTHORIZING THE ISSUANCE OF SUBPENAS

(Committee Resolution introduced by Mr. Fraser)

Whereas the Committee on International Relations has jurisdiction under House Rule X(1)(k)(7)—“Measures Related to Diplomatic Service,”—over laws providing for the privileges and immunities of foreign diplomatic personnel; and

Whereas an inquiry is being pursued by the Subcommittee on International Organizations into diplomatic privileges and immunities as they relate to activities of diplomatic personnel of the Republic of Korea in the United States: Now, therefore be it

Resolved, That the Committee on International Relations, pursuant to clause 2(m) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, confers upon the Subcommittee on International Organizations, through the chairman of the subcommittee, the authority to require, by subpoena, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such documents as it deems necessary for the conduct of such inquiry, subject to consultation with and approval of the chairman of the Committee on International Relations.

(Adopted by voice vote, without opposition, on September 1, 1976.)

APPENDIX 9

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